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Medicate and Segregate: How Due Process Fails 
to Protect Mentally Ill Inmates From Medically 
Inappropriate Confinement and Restraint 
by Peter J. Teravskis* 
INTRODUCTION 
Prior to the invention of modern psychiatric medications, 
confinement, restraint, and segregation were the primary mo-
dalities used in the treatment of serious mental illness.1 The dis-
covery of antipsychotic medications was one of the driving forces 
leading to the civil rights movement known as deinstitutionali-
zation where state mental hospitals were shuttered in favor of 
community treatment of the mentally ill.2 In reality, deinstitu-
tionalization is better understood as transinstitutionalization 
where mentally ill individuals have not been transferred to out-
patient treatment but into the penal system where they are (par-
 
* Peter J. Teravskis, 2021. J.D. Candidate, University of Minnesota Law School; 
M.D. Candidate, University of Minnesota Medical School; B.S., Neuroscience, 
Physiology, University of Minnesota College of Biological Sciences. In loving 
memory of Grant J. Hendrickson, June 20, 1967–August 24, 2020, “I don’t care 
what you believe as long as you believe it for yourself.” 
 
 1. See Kim J. Masters, Physical Restraint: A Historical Review and Cur-
rent Practice, 47 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 52, 52 (2017) (stating that physical re-
straint was the primary means by which society “manage[d] . . . psychiatric pa-
tients”). 
 2. See, e.g., Daniel Yohanna, Deinstitutionalization of People With Mental 
Illness: Causes and Consequences, 15 AMA J. ETHICS 886, 886–87 (2013) (dis-
cussing three factors leading to the policy of deinstitutionalization in the 1950s). 
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adoxically) confined, restrained, and segregated from the com-
munity.3 Put bluntly, the prison system has become the point-of-
care for many Americans with severe mental illness.4 
Unfortunately, a study of the New Jersey Department of 
Corrections’ involuntary antipsychotic administration program 
revealed that, in at least one jurisdiction, inmates with mental 
illnesses in need of treatment are not only separated from the 
community by imprisonment but can be separated from the gen-
eral prison population via an unwritten rule of automatic medi-
cal segregation.5 This finding underscores the fact that the Due 
 
 3. Cf. Bernard E. Harcourt, From the Asylum to the Prison: Rethinking the 
Incarceration Revolution, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1751, 1755–56 figs.1 & 2 (2006) (re-
porting a rise in the previously stable prison rate following, temporally, the fall 
in mental hospital population from the mid-1950s through the 1970s, and show-
ing a statistically significant autocorrelation between homicide and institution-
alization rates since 1928); Yohanna, supra note 2, at 888 (asking, “[w]hy are so 
many people with severe mental illness placed inappropriately in our jails and 
prisons?”). 
 4. See, e.g., H. Richard Lamb & Linda E. Weinberger, The Shift of Psychi-
atric Inpatient Care From Hospitals to Jails and Prisons, 33 J. AM. ACAD. PSY-
CHIATRY L. 529, 529 (2005) (“For many [persons with severe mental illness], 
their psychiatric inpatient care is now provided in jails and prisons.”). The Na-
tional Institute of Mental Health defines “serious mental illness” as “as a men-
tal, behavioral, or emotional disorder resulting in serious functional impair-
ment, which substantially interferes with or limits one or more major life 
activities.” Mental Illness, NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, 
https://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/statistics/mental-illness.shtml (last updated 
Jan. 2021). This definition is broad and functionally based. See id. (“The burden 
of mental illnesses is particularly concentrated among those who experience 
disability due to [serious mental illness].” (emphases added)). It encompasses 
manifestations of myriad diseases including major depression, schizophrenia, 
and bipolar disorder. What is Mental Illness?, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, 
https://www.psychiatry.org/patients-families/what-is-mental-illness (last up-
dated Aug. 2018). However, in the context of compulsory medication, antipsy-
chotic agents (also called neuroleptic or psychotropic agents) are a commonly 
utilized modality and are the focus of most relevant law. Cf. KONRAD FRANCO 
ET AL., HOW MANY INCARCERATED INDIVIDUALS RECEIVED PSYCHOTROPIC MED-
ICATION IN CALIFORNIA JAILS: 2012–2017 1 (2018), https://calhps.com/reports/
PolicyBrief_PsychotropicMedications_CalHPS.pdf (discussing a rapid increase 
in the use of antipsychotic drugs among other psychotropic medications in the 
California jail system). 
 5. See Anasuya Salem et al., Nonemergency Involuntary Antipsychotic 
Medication in Prison: Effects on Prison Inpatient Days and Disciplinary 
Charges, 43 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 159, 163 (2015) (“The unstated practice 
in the [New Jersey Department of Corrections] has been to move inmates onto 
a prison inpatient unit upon commencement of involuntary medication and to 
err on keeping the patients there for the security of both the inmates and oth-
ers.”). A companion article by Henry S. Levine & Bruce C. Gage describes the 
policy thus: “the tendency in the system studied . . . is to keep [inmates] on an 
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Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, at present, has 
not been extended to curtail the anachronistic practice of confin-
ing, restraining, and segregating inmates with mental illness in 
need of treatment. 
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part I examines the history 
of confinement, restraint, and segregation of the mentally ill and 
charts the invention of antipsychotic medications and their use 
in modern psychiatric practice. Part II explores the paradox of 
transinstitutionalization and the custom of medically segregat-
ing inmates in need of psychiatric treatment. Part III describes 
the due process protections afforded to mentally ill individuals 
both in the community and in the penal system. Part IV explains 
how existing due process requirements fail to protect inmates 
from involuntary medical segregation simply because they are 
mentally ill and in need of treatment. Finally, I propose that 
courts should view medical segregation as it was viewed histor-
ically: as a treatment modality. Accordingly, the same due pro-
cess protections which shield inmates from medically unneces-
sary and capricious involuntary medication, should insulate 
them from medically unnecessary and automatic confinement 
and restraint. 
I. HISTORICAL AND MODERN PSYCHIATRIC PRACTICE 
A. HISTORY OF PSYCHIATRIC CONFINEMENT, RESTRAINT, AND 
SEGREGATION 
Prior to the discovery of pharmaceutical agents for the treat-
ment of mental illness, physical restraint was the primary 
means by which society “manage[d] . . . psychiatric patients.”6 
Eighteenth century law justified the practice based on a “quid 
pro quo principle.”7 “Permission to restrain these people was 
granted under the assumption that it would be of benefit to them 
 
inpatient unit during the entire duration of t[he involuntary antipsychotic] pro-
tocol, regardless of whether there is behavioral improvement.” Henry S. Levine 
& Bruce C. Gage, Commentary: Involuntary Antipsychotics in Prison—Extend-
ing Harper, Contracting Care?, 43 J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry L. 165, 169 (2015). 
They hypothesized that this effect may affect the disciplinary charges accrued 
by inmates, thus making any finding of a reduction of violence “less generaliza-
ble” to the non-prison community. Id. 
 6. Masters, supra note 1, at 52. 
 7. Id. 
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and that the restraint would lead to an improvement or cessa-
tion in their unruly behavior.”8 This practice was largely unchal-
lenged until the mid-twentieth century when civil rights objec-
tions began to be leveled against physical restraint as a medical 
practice.9 Concurrently, the earliest forms of psychopharma-
cotherapy (a triad of neurologically active compounds: morphine, 
potassium bromide, and chloral hydrate) were discovered.10 
These agents allowed for “day and night-time sedation . . . [and] 
the replacement of physical restraint by pharmacological means 
in behavior control.”11 While additional sedative agents were 
added to the pharmacopeia during the first half of the twentieth 
century12 including, notably, antihistamines,13 in the United 
States, physical restraint remained the predominant modality 
for controlling the behavior of psychiatric patients.14 
This state of affairs was disrupted by the synthesis of chlor-
promazine (branded Thorazine) in 195115 and the deinstitution-
alization movement.16 Chlorpromazine quickly accrued a wealth 
of evidence suggesting its beneficial effects: unlike prior agents, 
chlorpromazine was not merely a sedative agent but affected the 
clinical course of psychosis.17 The success of chlorpromazine in 
the treatment of psychosis led to a dramatic reduction in the 
 
 8. Id. at 52–53. 
 9. See id. at 52 (“It became increasingly obvious through the years that 
such practices were violations of patients’ civil rights.”). 
 10. See Thomas A. Ban, Pharmacotherapy of Mental Illness—A Historical 
Analysis, 25 PROGRESS NEURO-PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGICAL & BIOLOGICAL PSY-
CHIATRY 709, 710–11 (2001) (discussing the discovery and use of these early 
drugs). 
 11. Id. at 711. 
 12. See id. at 712–13 (discussing the implications of chlorpromazine and 
five other early antipsychotic drugs to treatment regimens in the early twenti-
eth century). 
 13. See id. at 712 (“The origin of chlorpromazine was in the synthesis of the 
phenothiazine structure in 1883, and in research with antihistamin[es] . . . .”). 
 14. See Masters, supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 15. See Thomas A. Ban, Fifty Years Chlorpromazine: A Historical Perspec-
tive, 3 NEUROPSYCHIATRIC DISEASE AND TREATMENT 495, 495 (2007) (describ-
ing the discovery of chlorpromazine); Jeffrey A. Lieberman, Disease Modifying 
Effects of Antipsychotic Drugs in Schizophrenia: A Clinical and Neurobiological 
Perspective, 17 WORLD PSYCHIATRY 163, 163 (2018) (describing the discovery of 
chlorpromazine). 
 16. See Yohanna, supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 17. See, e.g., Lieberman, supra note 15, at 163–64 (describing early indica-
tions that antipsychotic medications alter the disease course of schizophrenia). 
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physical restraint of psychiatric patients in the United States.18 
The development of an animal model to screen novel compounds 
for chlorpromazine-like effects with reduced drowsiness led to 
the invention of a new class of psychopharmaceutical agents: the 
phenothiazines.19 Phenothiazines were thought to be primarily 
active via inhibition of serotonin-mediated neurotransmission in 
the brain.20 In the early 1970s, scientific interest shifted to the 
effects of antipsychotics on dopamine receptors.21 This “dopa-
mine hypothesis of schizophrenia” remains the predominant 
neuropsychological explanation of schizophrenia to this day.22 
B. MODERN TRENDS IN PSYCHIATRY 
In treating serious mental illness, modern psychiatric prac-
tice focuses on the use of pharmacological agents that alter the 
 
 18. Cf. Henry Brill & Robert E. Patton, Analysis of 1955–1956 Population 
Fall in New York State Mental Hospitals in First Year of Large-Scale Use of 
Tranquilizing Drugs, 114 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 509, 510 fig.1 (1957) (illustrating 
an inverse correlation between the rise of “patients receiving tranquilizing 
drugs” and the fall in “[s]omatic therapy and restraint-seclusion”). 
 19. See Holly Moore, The Role of Rodent Models in The Discovery of New 
Treatments for Schizophrenia: Updating Our Strategy, 36 SCHIZOPHRENIA 
BULL. 1066, 1067 (2010) (recounting the move from “serendipit[ous]” discovery 
to systematic animal model-based discovery of antipsychotics in the 1950s). 
 20. See Borisz Varga et al., Possible Biological and Clinical Applications of 
Phenothiazines, 37 ANTICANCER RES. 5983, 5986 (2017) (“For phenothiazine an-
tipsychotics, the inhibition of serotonin receptors results in anxiolytic and anti-
depressant activity . . . .”). See generally Ban, supra note 10, at 714 (describing 
the discovery of the neurotransmitter “serotonin” and the early drugs that in-
fluenced serotonergic neurotransmission). 
 21. See generally Alan A. Baumeister & Jennifer L. Francis, Historical De-
velopment of the Dopamine Hypothesis of Schizophrenia, 11 J. HIST. NEUROSCI-
ENCES 265 (2002) (discussing the history of the shift from the serotonin hypoth-
esis of schizophrenia, first proposed in 1954, to the dopamine hypothesis). 
 22. See id. (“The hypothesis that an overactivity of dopamine systems in 
the brain is a central aspect of the pathogenesis of schizophrenia is one of the 
earliest, most enduring, and most influential of the modern neurochemical the-
ories of mental disorders.” (emphasis added)); cf. Ralph Brisch et al., The Role 
of Dopamine in Schizophrenia from a Neurobiological and Evolutionary Per-
spective: Old Fashioned, but Still in Vogue, FRONTIERS IN PSYCHIATRY, May 19, 
2014, at 1 (discussing the continued focus on the role of hyperactive dopamine 
receptors in the development of schizophrenic symptoms). But cf., ERIC KAN-
DEL, THE DISORDERED MIND: WHAT UNUSUAL BRAINS TELL US ABOUT OUR-
SELVES 90–94 (2018) (discussing the role of dopamine in early biological treat-
ments of schizophrenia but noting that newer antipsychotic medications have 
implicated the involvement of “serotonergic and histaminergic pathways” as 
well). 
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“balance” of neurotransmitters in the brain.23 Antipsychotic 
drugs are the predominant treatment modality used. Presently, 
antipsychotic drugs are divided into two broad categories de-
fined by the mechanism of action, side effect profile, and date of 
development. First generation antipsychotics (FGAs), like chlor-
promazine, inhibit dopamine, histamine, and acetylcholine re-
ceptors to “varying degrees;” their dopamine receptor inhibition 
is strongly associated with extrapyramidal symptom (EPS) side 
effects.24 By contrast, second generation antipsychotics 
(SGAs)—also called atypical antipsychotics—were developed in 
the 1980s and inhibit both dopamine and serotonin receptors in 
the brain.25 SGAs carry a reduced but non-zero risk of EPS side 
effects; however, many are associated with metabolic side effects 
including diabetes and obesity.26 FGAs are further divided into 
two classes based upon the strength of their dopaminergic inhi-
bition: weak FGAs, like chlorpromazine, and strong FGAs, like 
haloperidol.27 A series of large studies demonstrated that some 
SGAs were equal if not superior to FGAs in the treatment of 
schizophrenia.28 Further, physicians largely prefer prescribing 
SGAs over FGAs.29 
 
 23. See KANDEL, supra note 22, at 73 (noting how in the 1990s, researchers 
like Aaron Beck discovered how to use psychopharmacological agents to “restore 
the balance of chemicals in the brain”). But see Ronald W. Pies, Debunking the 
Two Chemical Imbalance Myths, Again, PSYCHIATRIC TIMES, Aug. 1, 2019, at 9 
(arguing that the “chemical imbalance theory” was never actually a credible 
theory in psychiatry). 
 24. See AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, FIRST-GENERA-
TION VERSUS SECOND-GENERATION ANTIPSYCHOTICS IN ADULTS: COMPARATIVE 
EFFECTIVENESS 1 (2013), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK142851/pdf/
Bookshelf_NBK142851.pdf (comparing first- and second-generation antipsy-
chotic medication classes; FGAs blockade of the “dopamine type 2” receptor is 
thought to be responsible for EPS side effects). 
 25. See Keith Willner et al., Atypical Antipsychotic Agents, in STATPEARLS 
(2020) (listing the active targets of SGAs). 
 26. See id. (listing, generally, the metabolic effects of SGA); see also John 
Muench & Ann M. Hammer, Adverse Effects of Antipsychotic Medications, 81 
AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 617, 617–19; tbl.3 (2010) (summarizing the adverse effects 
of FGAs and SGAs). 
 27. See Muench & Hammer, supra note 26 (comparing FGAs that weakly 
or strongly bind dopamine receptors). 
 28. See generally John M. Davis et al., A Meta-Analysis of the Efficacy of 
Second-Generation Antipsychotics, 60 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 553, 559 
(2003) (“Some SGAs . . . are significantly more efficacious than FGAs, whereas 
others are not proven to be so.”). 
 29. See, e.g., Maxine D. Fisher, Antipsychotic Patterns of Use in Patients 
with Schizophrenia: Polypharmacy Versus Monotherapy, 14 BMC PSYCHIATRY 
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Neither treatment with FGAs nor SGAs is without risk. EPS 
side effects include dyskinesia (often tardive dyskinesia—abnor-
mal, involuntary movement), Parkinsonism (cogwheel-like rigid-
ity), akinesia (loss of voluntary movement), akathisia (restless-
ness), and neuroleptic malignant syndrome (a life-threatening 
condition characterized by fever, tremors, muscle cramps, unsta-
ble blood pressure, and altered mental status including delirium 
and coma).30 Many EPS side effects may persist after cessation 
of antipsychotic treatment.31 FGAs and SGAs may also cause a 
heart arrythmia called QT prolongation which can predispose 
patients to a life-threatening ventricular arrhythmia called tor-
sades de pointes.32 Many SGA are associated with an increased 
risk of metabolic disorders including obesity, derangement of 
blood cholesterol levels, and diabetes mellitus.33 Additionally, 
clozapine, an early SGA recommended as a second- or third-line 
treatment for drug-resistant schizophrenia, has been associated 
with a very rare but life-threatening side effect called agranulo-
cytosis, wherein certain white blood cells necessary to fight off 
foreign pathogens are dramatically reduced.34 An inmate’s inter-
est in avoiding these life threatening, functional, and aesthetic 
side effects has been recognized by the Supreme Court.35 
Multiple FGAs and SGAs are available in both oral and in-
jectable formulations which have short half-lives, as well as 
long-acting-injectable—also called “depot”—formulations which 
 
tbl.2 (2014) (showing 86.6% of patients studied on monotherapy were taking an 
SGA compared to only 13.4% taking an FGA; of patients taking more than one 
antipsychotic medication, only 26.5% of regimens included an FGA; the remain-
der were combinations of SGAs). 
 30. See Muench & Hammer, supra note 26, at 618–21 (discussing the EPS 
side effects of SGAs and FGAs). Different EPS side effect profiles are observed 
in different FGAs and SGAs. See id. at 619, tbl.3 (illustrating the prevalence of 
side effects for FGAs and SGAs). 
 31. Cf. Stanley N. Caroff et al., Movement Disorders Induced by Antipsy-
chotic Drugs: Implications of the CATIE Schizophrenia Trial, 29 NEUROLOGIC 
CLINICS 127, 128–29 (2011) (noting that dystonia, a common EPS side effect of 
antipsychotic medications, may actually worsen after the cessation of antipsy-
chotic agents). 
 32. See Muench & Hammer, supra note 26, at 620. 
 33. See id. at 621. 
 34. See id. at 620. 
 35. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229 (1990) (“While the thera-
peutic benefits of antipsychotic drugs are well documented, it is also true that 
the drugs can have serious, even fatal, side effects.”). 
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can be effective for weeks, rather than hours.36 When initially 
developed, depot antipsychotics were not commonly pre-
scribed.37 This stemmed from the belief that they posed an in-
creased risk of prolonged side effects and their action cannot be 
rapidly stopped if side effects develop.38 More recent studies 
show that this is not the case; depot medications are as safe and 
as effective as oral, short acting formulations.39 Depot medica-
tions offer the additional benefit of ensuring patient compliance 
without daily observation.40 For this reason, treatment advocacy 
organizations have recently begun to promote their use as an al-
ternative to inpatient civil commitment.41 
II. THE PARADOX OF DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION AND 
MEDICAL SEGREGATION IN PRISON 
Compared to medical reforms in continental Europe, the 
United States was late to abandon Freudian, neurostructural, 
 
 36. See Sofia Brissos et al., The Role of Long-Acting Injectable Antipsychot-
ics in Schizophrenia: A Critical Appraisal, 4 THERAPEUTIC ADVANCES IN PSY-
CHOPHARMACOLOGY 198, 200 tbl.1 (2014) (listing the biologically active half-
lives of various oral and depot antipsychotics). 
 37. See id. at 198 (“[T]he concept of [long-acting injectable antipsychotics] 
for schizophrenia was not initially received warmly by the medical profession 
for fears of increased side effects, lack of efficacy, and the fact this was seen as 
an attempt by psychiatrists to impose a treatment upon patients without due 
regard to their feelings or rights . . . .”). 
 38. See Mary V. Seeman, Drawbacks of Long-Acting Intramuscular Anti-
psychotic Injections, 1 J CLINICAL & PRACTICAL NURSING 12, 16 (2017) (“[O]nce 
the drug is in the muscle and side effects develop, they can remain unalleviated 
for a very long time.”); cf., e.g., Brissos et al., supra note 36, at 198 (stating depot 
antipsychotics were “not initially received warmly by the medical profession for 
fears of increased side effects”); C. Besenius et al., Health Professionals’ Atti-
tudes to Depot Injection Antipsychotic Medication: A Systematic Review, 17 J. 
PSYCHIATRIC & MENTAL HEALTH NURSING 452, 453, 458 (2010) (finding many 
physicians believe depot antipsychotics have a greater risk of more numerous 
and more severe side effects than equivalent oral antipsychotic formulations). 
 39. See generally Brissos et al., supra note 36, at 202 (“Severe side ef-
fects . . . may occur; nevertheless, there [sic] are rare and there seems to be no 
increased risk for EPS liability . . . .”). 
 40. Cf. id. at 202 (“[I]f a patient suffers a relapse, despite receiving regular 
[depot injection] treatment, it is then clear that compliance is not the rea-
son . . . .”). 
 41. See, e.g., THE AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, PRACTICE GUIDELINE FOR THE 
TREATMENT OF PATIENTS WITH SCHIZOPHRENIA 118 (2020) (recommending 
long-acting injectable formulations for outpatient commitment); TREATMENT 
ADVOCACY CENTER, WHAT CAN YOU DO IF SOMEONE WITH A SERIOUS MENTAL 
ILLNESS REFUSES TREATMENT? 4 (2014) (noting and suggesting depot medica-
tions for use in community civil commitment). 
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and restraint-based methods of treating mental illness.42 The 
shift to modern pharmacological treatment practices was ulti-
mately spurred on by a civil rights movement known as deinsti-
tutionalization. However, deinstitutionalization did not live up 
to its name: it may have been a primary driver of the transinsti-
tutionalization of the mentally ill from the asylum to the prison 
where they can be further confined, restrained, and segregated 
in inpatient medical units. 
A. DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION OR TRANSINSTITUTIONALIZATION? 
In the early 1950s, a confluence of political, legal, and social 
factors led to a seismic shift in the organization and funding of 
mental health service infrastructure in the United States.43 
Chief among these was a newfound public awareness of the abys-
mal conditions found within state asylums and mental hospitals 
conjoined with a spreading skepticism of the efficacy and hu-
maneness of midcentury psychiatric practices.44 These factors 
culminated in a policy movement in the 1960s and 1970s known 
as deinstitutionalization, wherein laws and norms came to dis-
favor the involuntary commitment of mentally ill individuals in 
mental hospitals or asylums, resulting in a decades-long process 
 
 42. See Masters, supra note 1, at 53. 
 43. See, e.g., Lamb & Weinberger, supra note 4, at 529 (noting “structural 
changes that have been made in the mental health system—namely, a radical 
reduction in long-term, intermediate, and short-term psychiatric inpatient 
treatment under mental health’s jurisdiction”). 
 44. See Enric J. Novella, Theoretical Accounts on Deinstitutionalization 
and the Reform of Mental Health Services: A Critical Review, 11 MED. HEALTH 
CARE & PHIL. 303, 312 (2008) (noting the importance of public perception of 
“maltreat[ment]” in asylums as well as “a radical questioning of their therapeu-
tic value” in the early deinstitutionalization movement). Concern over the in-
humane practices in state mental hospitals coincided with the close of the 
“Freudian Enlightenment” which “competed with somatic therapies—shock, in-
sulin, and psychosurgery” as well as behavioral science and psychopharmacol-
ogy in the 1950s. Milton Greenblatt, Deinstitutionalization and Reinstitution-
alization of the Mentally Ill, in HOMELESSNESS: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 48 
(1992). On the whole, the somatic practices which entailed institutionalization 
in state mental hospitals was no longer required given the outpatient treatment 
success of novel antipsychotic “tranquilizing” agents such as chlorpromazine. 
Cf., e.g., Brill & Patton, supra note 18, at 510 fig.1 (illustrating an inverse cor-
relation between the rise of “patients receiving tranquilizing drugs” and the fall 
in “[s]omatic therapy and restraint-seclusion”). 
84 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 22:2 
 
of emptying state mental hospitals.45 Between 1955 and 1994, 
the population of patients in state mental hospitals had de-
creased from 558,239 to 71,619 despite population growth over 
that time period.46 In the 1990s, state funding for state mental 
hospitals was diverted into community health programs, result-
ing in a wave of hospital closures in addition to a reduction in 
beds.47 Ultimately, before the start of the twenty-first century, 
ninety-five percent of state mental hospital beds had been elim-
inated.48 
Despite the libertarian promise of deinstitutionalization, 
community infrastructure outside of state mental hospitals 
proved inadequate to the task of providing homes, medical care, 
and other social services to the formerly committed.49 A large 
portion of deinstitutionalized persons were released to the 
 
 45. See, e.g., ANNE E. PARSONS, FROM ASYLUM TO PRISON: DEINSTITUTION-
ALIZATION AND THE RISE OF MASS INCARCERATION AFTER 1945 3 (2018) (attrib-
uting deinstitutionalization—defined as “the downsizing and closure of state-
run mental hospitals”—starting in the 1950s and rapidly accreting in the 1960s 
and 1970s, to “[c]ommunity-based approaches in psychiatry, legal challenges to 
commitment laws, and activism around patients’ rights”). 
 46. See E. FULLER TORREY, OUT OF THE SHADOWS: CONFRONTING AMER-
ICA’S MENTAL ILLNESS CRISIS app.1 (1997) (summarizing the decrease in open 
state mental hospital beds during the five decades of deinstitutionalization from 
the 1950s to the mid-1990s); cf. William H. Fisher et al., The Changing Role of 
the State Psychiatric Hospital, 28 HEALTH AFF. 676, 678 (2009) (noting a decline 
of seventy percent of state hospital beds between 1972 and 1990; however, this 
was not due to the closure of hospitals). 
 47. Fisher et al., supra note 46, at 677–79. 
 48. Id. at 676 (“[Deinstitutionalization] efforts led to a 95 percent reduction 
in the country’s state hospital population.”). 
 49. See, e.g., Nancy K. Rhoden, The Limits of Liberty: Deinstitutionaliza-
tion, Homelessness, and Libertarian Theory, 31 EMORY L.J. 375, 376 (1982) 
(“The reason deinstitutionalization has failed is simple: adequate community 
facilities have not been created.”). 
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streets,50 likely contributing to a growing population of individ-
uals with serious mental illness who were also homeless.51 Indi-
viduals with serious mental illness are disproportionally af-
fected by homelessness.52 There is also an inverse correlation 
between available state mental hospital beds and the population 
of homeless individuals with mental illness.53 Adding insult to 
injury, the seeds of mass incarceration were planted in the early 
 
 50. See id. at 387 (“Many patients, whether they have gone to nursing 
homes, halfway houses, welfare hotels, or to the streets, are abused and ne-
glected in their new ‘homes’ just as they were in the public hospitals from 
whence they came.”); see also H. Richard Lamb, Deinstitutionalization and the 
Homeless Mentally Ill, 35 HOSP. & COMMUNITY. PSYCHIATRY 899, 899 (1984) 
(discussing the connection between deinstitutionalization and homelessness in 
the United States and comparing to Israel, where homelessness “of the chroni-
cally mentally ill is not a significant problem” and where “deinstitutionalization 
has barely begun”). 
 51. But see Peter Winkler et al. Deinstitutionalised Patients, Homelessness 
and Imprisonment: Systematic Review, 208 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 421, 421 (2016) 
(“Since deinstitutionalization began, arguments that psychiatric reforms have 
led to former patients entering prisons and becoming homeless have been pro-
lifically published in the professional literature, as well as in newspapers. As a 
rule, these arguments have been based on either ecological studies or—more 
often—personal observations or judgements.” (endnotes omitted)). Observa-
tional studies have supported the claim, but have also yielded “contradictory 
findings.” Id. However, social science studies conducted during deinstitutional-
ization in the United States have been criticized due to political pressure to 
“emphasize individual and cultural rather than structural aspects of poverty.” 
Marian Moser Jones, Creating a Science of Homelessness During the Reagan 
Era, 92 MILBANK Q. 139, 140 (2015). 
 52. See Hunter L. McQuistion et al. Challenges for Psychiatry in Serving 
Homeless People With Psychiatric Disorders, 54 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 669, 669 
(2003) (“[R]eliable studies describing psychiatric illness showed reasonably con-
sistently that one-third to one-half of homeless people had severe psychiatric 
disorders, such as major mood disorder (19 percent to 30 percent) and schizo-
phrenia (11 percent to 17 percent).”); cf., e.g., 2 CLAUDIA D. SOLARI ET AL., THE 
2013 ANNUAL HOMELESS ASSESSMENT REPORT (AHAR) TO CONGRESS 7-7 
(2014) (finding 30.3% of adults living in permanent supportive housing self-re-
ported suffering from a disabling mental health issue). Compare these numbers 
to the estimated 4.5% of U.S. adults, generally, with serious mental illness. See 
Mental Illness, NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, https://www.nimh.nih.gov/
health/statistics/mental-illness.shtml (last updated Mar. 2021) (“In 2019, there 
were an estimated 13.1 million adults aged 18 or older in the United States with 
[serious mental illness]. This number represented 5.2% of all U.S. adults.”). 
 53. Fred E. Markowitz, Psychiatric Hospital Capacity, Homelessness, And 
Crime and Arrest Rates, 44 CRIMINOLOGY 45, 62 (2006) (“[T]he results indicate 
a moderate link between public hospital capacity and homelessness at the city 
level that is not conditioned by private psychiatric beds, general hospital psy-
chiatric beds or community-based expenditures.”). 
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1970s, at the height of deinstitutionalization.54 These and other 
broad sociological changes led, in part, to a substantial rise in 
the number of individuals with serious mental illness who re-
ceived their psychiatric care in various inappropriate care set-
tings such as emergency departments or jails and prisons.55 
Some scholars have abandoned the term “deinstitutionalization” 
entirely, preferring the term “transinstitutionalization” to refer 
to the movement of persons with mental illness from state men-
tal hospitals into the penal system.56 However, observational 
studies of the relationship between homelessness, incarceration, 
and deinstitutionalization have yielded mixed results.57 
Estimates of the number of United States prison inmates 
with serious mental illness vary dramatically.58 A commonly re-
lied upon study places the number in the range of sixteen to 
twenty-four percent of the prison population.59 The most recent 
 
 54. PARSONS, supra note 45, at 3 (“Mental health centers in prisons and 
jails grew at the very same moment that involuntary confinement in mental 
hospitals declined. Today, this new system of mass incarceration disproportion-
ately affects people with psychiatric disabilities.”). 
 55. Yohanna, supra note 2, at 889 (“Emergency rooms are crowded with the 
acutely ill patients with long psychiatric histories but no plausible disposi-
tions.”) Further, in the absence of functioning state hospitals to act as “entry 
points to the mental health system . . . most people with severe mental ill-
ness . . . otherwise will wind up in jail or prison.” Id. 
 56. See, e.g., PARSONS, supra note 45, at 3 (“Some people have explained 
this phenomenon as a transinstitutionalization rather than a deinstitutionali-
zation.”). 
 57. Cf. Winkler et al., supra note 51, at 421–23 (summarizing the results of 
ecological studies of the relationship between homelessness and deinstitution-
alization and reporting the results of a systematic review of twenty-three em-
pirical cohort and research articles into the relationship between deinstitution-
alization, homelessness, and incarceration where the authors found no 
meaningful correlation). 
 58. Cf. Seth J. Prins, The Prevalence of Mental Illnesses in U.S. State Pris-
ons: A Systematic Review, 65 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 862, 866 (2014) (“[T]he wide 
variation in prevalence found among even the more robust studies reviewed 
here warrants caution against generalizations from any single study.”). 
 59. See, e.g., Lamb & Weinberger, supra note 4, at 529 (“The latest meth-
odologically sound estimates of the number of persons in jails and prisons diag-
nosed with major depression, schizophrenia, and other psychotic disorders, and 
bipolar disorder yielded percentages that ranged from 16 to 24 percent.”) (foot-
note omitted) (citing 1 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CORRECTIONAL HEALTH 
CARE, THE HEALTH STATUS OF SOON-TO-BE-RELEASED INMATES 22–25 (2002)). 
A more recent survey conducted by the Bureau of Justice Statistics looked at 
self-reported “experiences that met the threshold for serious psychological dis-
tress . . . in the 30 days prior to a survey,” finding that number to be fourteen 
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Department of Justice estimate of the total “incarcerated popu-
lation” was 2,162,400.60 If prior estimates remained constant, 
between 346,000 and 519,000 people with mental illness are in-
carcerated. There is a broad consensus that individuals with se-
rious mental illness are overrepresented in forensic popula-
tions.61 The explanation for the overrepresentation of people 
with mental illness in jails and prisons is likely multifactorial 
and remains elusive.62 While an obvious explanation, studying 
the relationship between mental illness and the likelihood of 
committing crime is difficult to assess as a matter of criminolog-
ical inquiry given confounding variables such as vagrancy laws, 
which disproportionally affect persons with serious mental ill-
ness who are without homes, 63 as well as poor data reporting at 
the state-level. As a result, studies of index crime measures,64 
 
and twenty-six percent in federal prison and jail respectively. JENNIFER BRON-
SON & MARCUS BERZOFSKY, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 250612 INDI-
CATORS OF MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS REPORTED BY PRISONERS AND JAIL IN-
MATES, 2011–12 1 (2017). It is important to view this second statistic with 
caution as it does not require a medical diagnosis of mental illness to qualify 
and is based on self-reporting alone. Cf. id. at 2 (describing, briefly, the meth-
odology). 
 60. DANIELLE KAEBLE & MARY COWHIG, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
NCJ 251211, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2016 1–2 
tab.1 (2018) (estimating the total “incarcerated population” as of December 31, 
2016). 
 61. See, e.g., Seth J. Prins, Does Transinstitutionalization Explain the 
Overrepresentation of People With Serious Mental Illnesses in the Criminal Jus-
tice System?, 47 COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH J. 716, 717 (2011) (“Though re-
searchers disagree about the transinstitutionalization hypothesis and potential 
solutions to the problem, there is broad consensus that people with [severe men-
tal illness] are overrepresented in the criminal justice system and that correc-
tional facilities are not ideal treatment settings.”). 
 62. Cf. id., at 716–17 (describing a lack of agreement as to the “policy 
trends” that have resulted in high numbers of individuals with serious mental 
illness in prison, as well as noting that “involvement in the criminal justice sys-
tem . . . is more accurately described as entrenchment,” pointing to longer incar-
ceration and reduced likelihood to become and remain parolees). 
 63. Cf. Chris Herring et al., Pervasive Penality: How the Criminalization of 
Poverty Perpetuates Homelessness, 67 SOC. PROBS. 131, 138–40 tbl.1 (2019) (an-
alyzing the impact of criminalization policies such as vagrancy laws on perpet-
uating homelessness, specifically providing subgroup analysis of mentally dis-
abled individuals). But cf. James D. Livingston, Contact Between Police and 
People With Mental Disorders: A Review of Rates, 67 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 850, 
852 (2016) (finding that the rate of police encounters for people with mental 
disorders are “in line with rates in the United States” (endnote omitted)). 
 64. Cf. NATHAN JAMES & LOGAN RISHARD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., HOW 
CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES IS MEASURED 42 tab.1 (2018) (listing index of-
fenses measured by the United States government). 
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such as the rate of violent crime or assault, are often used to 
assess involvement with the criminal justice system between 
populations of people with mental illness and the general popu-
lation.65 
At the height of deinstitutionalization, the prevailing aca-
demic view was that people with mental illness are no more or 
less likely to be violent than the population at large.66 However, 
more extensive studies have revealed a more complex relation-
ship implicating serious mental illness—especially when comor-
bid with drug abuse—in increased rates of violent crime.67 Nota-
bly, this effect is diminished by treatment.68 Nonetheless, 
serious mental illness is a much stronger predictor of being the 
 
 65. Cf., e.g., Patricia A. Brennan et al., Major Mental Disorders and Crim-
inal Violence in a Danish Birth Cohort, 57 ARCHIVE GEN. PSYCHIATRY 494, 495 
(2000) (describing why a Danish index of felony-level crimes was used in the 
study). 
 66. See Heather Stuart, Violence and Mental Illness: An Overview, 2 
WORLD PSYCHIATRY 121, 122 (2003) (“Prior to 1980, the dominant view was that 
the mentally ill were no more, and often less likely to be violent.”). 
 67. See, e.g., Seena Fazel et al., Schizophrenia, Substance Abuse, and Vio-
lent Crime, 301 JAMA 2016, 2021 (2009) (“[T]he association between schizo-
phrenia and violent crime is minimal unless the patient is also diagnosed as 
having substance abuse comorbidity.”). But see Seena Fazel et al., Bipolar Dis-
order and Violent Crime, 67 ARCHIVE GEN. PSYCHIATRY 931, 935 (2010) 
(“[T]here was an increased risk for violent crime among individuals with bipolar 
disorder. Most of the excess violent crime was associated with substance abuse 
comorbidity.”) Note that the association between bipolar disorder and violent 
crime was confounded by a parallel finding that showed an increase in violent 
crime amongst sibling controls. Id. at 936. 
 68. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., Comparison of Antipsychotic Medi-
cation Effects on Reducing Violence in People With Schizophrenia, 193 BRIT. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 37, 39 (2008) (“[P]atients assigned to perphenazine showed a 
greater reduction in violence risk—from 19% at baseline to 7% at follow-up—
when compared with patients assigned to quetiapine, whose risk of violence de-
clined from 15% to 14% over the same period. Perphenazine did not differ from 
olanzapine, risperidone or ziprasidone.”); John E. Kraus & Brian B. Sheitman, 
Clozapine Reduces Violent Behavior in Heterogeneous Diagnostic Groups, 17 J. 
NEUROPSYCHIATRY & CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCES 36, 41 (2005) (“[C]lozapine 
was effective in markedly decreasing the number of violent episodes in persis-
tently violent patients, regardless of the underlying psychiatric diagnosis and 
even in the absence of psychotic symptoms.”). See generally Mental Illness and 
Violence, HARV. HEALTH PUB. (Jan. 2011), https://www.health.har-
vard.edu/newsletter_article/mental-illness-and-violence (“The research sug-
gests that adequate treatment of mental illness and substance abuse may help 
reduce rates of violence.”). 
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victim of violent crime than being the victimizer.69 Further, men-
tally ill inmates report being physically victimized at increased 
rates in prison compared to non-mentally ill inmates.70 Transin-
stitutionalization, it seems, has led to the reemergence of con-
finement and restraint in the treatment of inmates with mental 
illness—perhaps harming their mental health rather than heal-
ing. Regrettably, the process of confining, restraining, and seg-
regating those with serious mental illness does not cease its op-
eration at the prison gate. 
B. AUTOMATIC MEDICAL SEGREGATION OF INMATES RECEIVING 
INVOLUNTARY MEDICATION 
Until recently, there had been no empirical evidence as to 
the effectiveness of forced antipsychotic medication in prison.71 
Neither benefits to maintaining order in prisons nor the medical 
benefit of the practice has been comprehensively assayed.72 A 
2015 study of the New Jersey Department of Corrections’ 
nonemergency involuntary antipsychotic medication policy73 
was the first attempt to quantify these considerations.74 The 
study compared “in patient days” and “disciplinary charges” for 
 
 69. See Linda A. Teplin et al., Crime Victimization in Adults With Severe 
Mental Illness, 62 ARCHIVE GEN. PSYCHIATRY 911, 916 tbl.3 (2005) (finding in-
dividuals with serious mental illness had a four-fold increase in self-reported 
violent crime victimization over control). 
 70. See Cynthia L. Blitz et al., Physical Victimization in Prison: The Role of 
Mental Illness, 31 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 385, 391 (2008) (finding male and 
female inmates with mental disorders to be 1.6 and 1.7 times more likely to be 
victimized by another inmate); see also Kayla G. Jachimowski, The Relationship 
Between Mentally Disordered Inmates, Victimization, and Violence, 57 J. OF-
FENDER REHABILITATION 47, 56, 58 (2018) (finding a statistical increase in vic-
timization of mentally ill inmates compared to control, including in all sub-
groups by reported diagnosis except for the “anxiety” subgroup). 
 71. See Salem et al., supra note 5, at 160 (“[T]here has been no published 
study of involuntary medication of mentally ill inmates.”). 
 72. Id.; cf. Max Blau, Marketing Psychiatric Drugs to Jailers and Judges, 
THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 31, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/ar-
chive/2019/12/pharmaceutical-companies-are-marketing-drugs-jailers/604264/ 
(noting pharmaceutical companies efforts to lobby prison officials and judges to 
use certain psychotropic medications with “scant evidence of . . . effectiveness 
compared to competing treatments . . .”). 
 73. See generally Salem et al., supra note 5. 
 74. See id. at 160 (noting the New Jersey Department of Corrections (NJ 
DOC) “policy follows the Harper standard in the provision of administrative re-
view” and noting the requirement that “the prisoner’s liberty interests must be 
balanced against the state’s “legitimate penological interests” in maintaining 
safety.” (citing Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 224 (1990))). 
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inmates before and during a nonemergency involuntary antipsy-
chotic medication protocol.75 Psychiatrist Dr. Anasuya Salem 
and colleagues found that there was no significant difference in 
inpatient treatment days before or during the involuntary med-
ication protocol.76 However, three measures of disciplinary 
charges showed significant reductions during the protocol.77 
Interestingly, Salem and colleagues note that their results 
may not be attributable to the use of antipsychotic medication 
due to an “unstated practice . . . to move inmates onto a prison 
inpatient unit upon commencement of involuntary medication 
and to err on keeping the patients there for the security of both 
the inmates and others.”78 The authors note that “[i]nmates en-
joy the relative security and enhanced programming and atten-
tion offered on the inpatient units” and that inmates “occasion-
ally feign symptoms to secure placement on an inpatient unit 
and avoid release from the same.”79 A companion article to the 
Salem study amplifies, “[w]hen inmates are placed on an invol-
untary medication protocol, the tendency in the system studied, 
the New Jersey state prisons, is to keep them on an inpatient 
unit during the entire duration of that protocol, regardless of 
whether there is behavioral improvement.”80 While both articles 
suggest that the practice is harmless,81 automatic, near-univer-
sal medical segregation may implicate liberty interests. The ex-
tent to which medical segregation during involuntary treatment 
is justified and what legal remedies aggrieved inmates may pos-
sess must be addressed. 
Because prisons in the United States are primarily con-
trolled under state laws and regulations, it is difficult to deter-
mine how medical segregation is used throughout the country. 
An initial survey attempted to categorize medical and mental 
 
 75. Id. at 161. The study could not be randomized or placebo-controlled be-
cause NJ DOC policy prohibits experimentation on prisoners. Id. at 160. 
 76. Id. at 162 tbl.1 (displaying inpatient days weighted by time recorded 
before and during the protocol). 
 77. Id. (displaying weighted “mean number of inmates with charges,” 
“mean instances of charges per inmate,” and “average number of charges per 
inmate”). 
 78. Id. at 163. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Levine & Gage, supra note 5, at 169. 
 81. See id. (“The practice of keeping involuntary patients on prison hospital 
wards for the duration of their involuntary administrative order appears to be 
a humane and justifiable practice.”). 
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health facilities available in state prisons;82 however, it did not 
study the conditions and types of restrictions deployed in medi-
cally segregated wards. In fact, there has been no systematic ef-
fort to assess what medical segregation entails in various state 
prisons. This is further complicated by the potpourri of terminol-
ogy used to describe medical segregation in state and federal 
laws and regulations.83 Also, as Salem and colleagues point out, 
the degree to which medical segregation is used in the treatment 
of mental illness is unlikely to be captured in a survey of the laws 
and regulations governing prison segregation because it is con-
trolled by unwritten and unstated policies and practices.84 
Under New Jersey regulations, medical segregation is con-
sidered separate from punitive segregation (i.e., solitary confine-
ment). Narrative accounts of New Jersey’s medical segregation 
program show that segregated inmates have many of the same 
liberties as inmates in the general population.85 This is in stark 
contrast to solitary confinement, where most liberties are 
sharply curtailed.86 However, this is not the case in all state 
prison systems. In other states, medical and punitive segrega-
tion units are distinct in name only, and medically segregated 
 
 82. See E. FULLER TORREY ET AL., THE TREATMENT OF PERSONS WITH MEN-
TAL ILLNESS IN PRISONS AND JAILS: A STATE SURVEY 106 (2014) [hereinafter 
JOINT REPORT]. 
 83. Variously, states use terms like “segregated housing,” “punitive segre-
gation,” “disciplinary segregation,” and “administrative segregation” to refer to 
all levels of increased security, including intermediate and high security segre-
gation practices. See generally Jody Sundt, The Effect of Administrative Segre-
gation on Prison Order and Organizational Culture, in RESTRICTIVE HOUSING 
IN THE U.S.: ISSUES, CHALLENGES, AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 297, 298 (2016) 
(available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/250323.pdf) (classifying prison 
restriction by function). 
 84. See generally Salem et al., supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 85. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, PREA AUDIT REPORT 3 (2018) [here-
inafter PREA AUDIT REPORT] (“Medium custody: Each housing unit is sepa-
rated by fence. Inmates have little interaction with inmates from other housing 
units. Beds are located on eight to ten wings in each unit. They are double 
bunked with separation between four bed areas. One aisle way provides access 
to all the beds. They are fed in the unit and recreation is located outside the 
unit within the fence. Common bathrooms with a sink, toilet and shower are 
located at the front of each wing. These bathrooms provide security and pri-
vacy.”). 
 86. See id. (describing how different levels of custody offer different liber-
ties). 
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inmates are functionally kept in solitary confinement.87 It is not 
known whether these states also regularly place inmates receiv-
ing compulsory medication in solitary-confinement-like medical 
segregation. If mentally ill inmates on forced medication proto-
cols are kept in medical solitary confinement, it creates a bevy of 
medical and ethical problems: the American Psychiatric Associ-
ation strongly recommends against the solitary confinement of 
inmates with mental illness.88 However, it is an open question 
whether there are any legal protections for inmates in medical 
segregation. 
For the purposes of this Note, medical segregation can be 
separated into three categories. First, medical segregation can 
mirror the New Jersey system where there is an intermediate 
level of additional security and segregated inmates maintain 
most of the same freedoms afforded to the general population—
just in a separate location within the prison.89 Second, medical 
segregation may be equivalent to punitive segregation or solitary 
confinement where all but the barest freedoms are restricted.90 
Third, off-site segregation, where the prison lacks facilities to 
care for mentally ill inmates and must transfer them to mental 
hospitals or community hospitals.91 Due to security concerns, in-
mates are often shackled and may be under constant one-on-one 
 
 87. See, e.g., Melinda Tasca & Jillian Turanovic, Examining Race and Gen-
der Disparities in Restrictive Housing Placement, NAT’L CRIM. JUST. REFER-
ENCE SERV., Sept. 2018, at 3 (describing “mental health segregation” as part of 
a class of segregation including disciplinary segregation wherein inmates with 
mental illness are placed in “maximum security housing units”). 
 88. See AM. PHYCHOL. ASS’N, POSITION STATEMENT ON SEGREGATION OF 
PRISONERS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS (dec. 2012) (“Prolonged segregation of adult 
inmates with serious mental illness, with rare exceptions, should be avoided 
due to the potential for harm to such inmates.”). 
 89. See PREA AUDIT REPORT, supra note 85 and accompanying text (de-
scribing the audit findings of a New Jersey correctional facility). 
 90. See Sundt, supra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing why pris-
ons have classification systems and how those systems affect inmates). 
 91. See PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, STATE PRISONS AND THE DELIVERY OF 
HOSPITAL CARE: HOW STATES SET UP AND FINANCE OFF-SITE CARE FOR INCAR-
CERATED INDIVIDUALS 2 (2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-
analysis/reports/2018/07/19/state-prisons-and-the-delivery-of-hospital-care 
[hereinafter PEW STUDY] (“[A]ll states rely on hospitals for some specialist con-
sultations, diagnostic tests, surgery, and other services.”); cf. Joint Report, su-
pra note 82, at 43 (describing the need for Georgia jails to use local hospital beds 
for the treatment and housing of mentally ill detainees). However, this practice 
does not guarantee superior care or continuity of care. See Steven Ross Johnson, 
Prison Health Systems Need Better Integration Into the Community, MODERN 
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surveillance during stays at the community hospital.92 Their so-
cial interactions are dramatically curtailed and other privileges 
cease.93 Each of these varieties of medical segregation may be 
subject to a separate due process analysis. However, current due 
process law is limited in scope and applicability, meaning most 
mentally ill inmates are without protections from medically in-
appropriate confinement, restraint, and segregation within the 
prison. 
 
The proper role for the government in compelling the medi-
cation of individuals with mental illness both inside and outside 
of the prison system also continues to inspire rancorous debate.94 
It is, however, generally accepted that the level of mental health 
care provided to inmates suffering from serious mental illness in 
prison does not meet community standards of care.95 Further, 
 
HEALTHCARE (Oct. 11, 2018, 1:00 AM), https://www.modernhealthcare.com/ar-
ticle/20181011/NEWS/181019963/prison-health-systems-need-better-integra-
tion-into-the-community (discussing a report that found that “many states are 
struggling to adhere to their mandate to provide an adequate level of care for 
prisoners”). 
 92. See PEW STUDY, supra note 91, at 11–12 (describing methods of 
transport and security for prisoners receiving treatment at community hospi-
tals). This practice is predominately governed by the Eighth Amendment, Es-
telle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), and is outside the scope of this Note. 
 93. Cf., e.g., PEW STUDY, supra note 91, at 11 (describing specialized “hard-
ened” hospital floors, staffed by doctors and nurses but guarded by corrections 
officials, compared with “a single room guarded by two officers round-the-
clock”). 
 94. See, e.g., Damon Tweedy, The Heated Battle Over When to Commit a 
Patient Involuntarily to Psychiatric Care, WASH. POST (Oct. 21, 2016), 
http://wapo.st/2ePw3TU?tid=ss_mail (noting the interrelationship between the 
debate over civil commitment and the criminal justice system’s ability to care 
for people with mental illness); Haley Sweetland Edwards, Should Mentally Ill 
People Be Forced Into Treatment?, TIME (Feb. 20, 2015), 
https://time.com/3716426/mental-illness-treatment-cost/ (framing the debate 
from a budgetary perspective); see also Jacob Kurlander, Pro/Con: Outpatient 
Commitment for the Severely Mentally Ill, 5 VIRTUAL MENTOR 324, 324–25 
(2003) (summarizing recently published arguments for and against the practice 
of outpatient commitment); Alan R. Felthous, The Treatment of Persons with 
Mental Illness in Prisons and Jails: An Untimely Report, PSYCHIATRIC TIMES 
(Aug. 13, 2014) https://www.psychiatrictimes.com/forensic-psychiatry/treat-
ment-persons-mental-illness-prisons-and-jails-untimely-report (dissenting 
against suggestions that increased mental health services in prisons will alle-
viate concerns over mental illness and its treatment in prisons and jails). 
 95. See, e.g., JOINT REPORT, supra note 82, at 106 (recommending that state 
laws must be altered in order to provide appropriate mental health treatment 
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events associated with living in a penitentiary pose additional 
risks to the mental well-being of inmates with and without seri-
ous mental illness.96 In fact, the practice of prolonged, punitive 
segregation of inmates with serious mental illness has been con-
demned by the American Psychiatric Association.97 This profes-
sional society’s policy change represents a final abandonment of 
the physical-restraint-as-treatment model of psychiatric care in 
favor of pharmacological intervention in the treatment of mental 
illness. For this reason, it is all the more surprising that medical 
segregation is a “go to” component of treatment protocols in some 
jurisdictions for inmates with mental illness.98 Inmates do, how-
ever, retain some recognized liberty interests and associated due 
 
in prisons and jails); Jennifer M. Reingle Gonzales & Nadine M. Connell, Men-
tal Health of Prisoners: Identifying Barriers to Mental Health Treatment and 
Medication Continuity, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2328, 2331 tbl.1 (2014) (listing 
categories of multimodal or holistic care, finding a reduction in services availa-
ble to mentally ill inmates); cf. Anasseril E. Daniel, Care of the Mentally Ill in 
Prisons: Challenges and Solutions, 35 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 406 (2007) 
(asking, “Shouldn’t standards of care of psychiatric disorders be respected in 
the correctional setting as they are in other community provider settings?”). But 
cf. Maureen C. Olley et al., Mentally Ill Individuals in Limbo: Obstacles and 
Opportunities for Providing Psychiatric Services to Corrections Inmates with 
Mental Illness, 27 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 811, 830 (2009) (“Although there are 
innumerable challenges to providing expedient and appropriate mental health 
services to inmates experiencing mental health problems, the opportunity that 
is presented when an individual with mental health needs is in correctional cus-
tody also should not be overlooked.” (emphasis added)). 
 96. See Reingle Gonzales & Connell, supra note 95, at 2329 (“[C]rowded 
living quarters, lack of privacy, increased risk of victimization, and solitary con-
finement within the institution have been identified as strong correlates for self-
harm and adaptation challenges for those with mental health conditions in 
prison settings.” (footnotes omitted)). Notably, the deleterious effects of solitary 
or segregation and “supermax” housing have been studied extensively. See, e.g., 
Jeffery L. Metzner & Jamie Fellner, Solitary Confinement and Mental Illness 
in U.S. Prisons: A Challenge for Medical Ethics, 38 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 
104, 105 (2010) (“Mental health professionals are often unable to mitigate fully 
the harm associated with isolation.”); Craig Haney, Mental Health Issues in 
Long-Term Solitary and “Supermax” Confinement, 49 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 
124, 130 (2003) (“Evidence of the[] negative psychological effects comes from 
personal accounts, descriptive studies, and systematic research on solitary and 
supermax-type confinement . . . .”). 
 97. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, POSITION STATEMENT ON SEGREGATION OF 
PRISONERS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS (2017), http://nrcat.org/storage/docu-
ments/apa-statement-on-segregation-of-prisoners-with-mental-illness.pdf 
(“Prolonged segregation of adult inmates with serious mental illness, with rare 
exceptions, should be avoided due to the potential for harm to such inmates.”). 
 98. Salem et al., supra note 5 at 163. 
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process protections which limit the State’s authority to adminis-
ter involuntary treatments. 
III. DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS FOR THE MENTALLY 
ILL INSIDE AND OUTSIDE OF PRISON 
Because of the history of confinement, restraint, and segre-
gation of those with serious mental illness, the Supreme Court 
has developed a body of due process protections specific to this 
population. When considering legal protections for the mentally 
ill, a key distinction must be drawn between patients in the com-
munity and inmates in prison. However, the general formula for 
due process protection hangs on the balance between legitimate 
state interests and personal liberty interests. This interplay is 
illustrated by comparing government regulation of the behavior 
of mentally ill people in the community (where personal liberty 
interests are the strongest) and in prison (where the governmen-
tal interest is the strongest). 
A. THE RIGHT TO REFUSE TREATMENT 
The animating principle of modern American medical ethics 
is the principle of patient autonomy.99 The legal correlate to this 
principle of professional ethics is the right to refuse treatment 
as elaborated in Cruzan v. Director.100 In Cruzan, the Supreme 
Court held that due process operates, “to repose judgment on 
[medical decisions implicating life or death] with . . . the patient 
herself.”101 The Cruzan decision is widely understood to 
acknowledge a patient’s right to refuse medical care.102 However, 
 
 99. See Barbara Chubak, Clinical Responsibility in the Age of Patient Au-
tonomy, 11 AMA J. ETHICS 567, 567 (2009) (“In the United States, th[e interna-
tional patients’ rights] movement placed, and continues to place, a particular 
emphasis on individual choice . . . . Out of these ideas, the principle of respect 
for autonomy was born, and, since then, the influence of this single principle . . . 
has eclipsed that of the other principles . . . .”); see also Am. Med. Ass’n, Opin-
ions on Consent, Communication & Decision Making, in AMA CODE OF MEDI-
CAL ETHICS: OPINIONS ON CONSENT § 2.1.2 (2019), https://www.ama-
assn.org/system/files/2019-06/code-of-medical-ethics-chapter-2.pdf (“Respect 
for patient autonomy is central to professional ethics . . . .”). 
 100. 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
 101. Id. at 286. 
 102. See id. at 279 (“[F]or purposes of this case, we assume that the United 
States Constitution would grant a competent person a constitutionally pro-
tected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition.”); id. at 287 (O’Connor, 
J., concurring) (“I agree that a protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted 
medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions . . . .”); see also 
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the right to refuse medical care is not absolute; the Cruzan court 
noted that a patient’s, or her surrogate’s, right to refuse life sus-
taining treatment must be balanced against state interests.103 
Accordingly, courts have consistently upheld disease control 
laws which force the involuntary testing and treatment of com-
municable diseases in the community where state interests in 
compelling treatment are strong.104 State interests in compelling 
medical treatment of physical ailments in prison extend to cover 
a broader range of medical interventions.105 However, psycho-
tropic medications have unique characteristics which militate in 
favor of patient autonomy and counterbalance similarly unique 
state interests in involuntary administration. 
B. LEGAL PROTECTIONS IN THE COMMUNITY 
To begin, understanding the legal test for involuntary treat-
ment of people with mental illness in the community—where lib-
erty interests are at their acme—is crucial. Court precedent in 
 
Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 796 (1997) (“Everyone, regardless of physical con-
dition, is entitled, if competent, to refuse unwanted lifesaving medical treat-
ment . . . .” (emphasis in original)); cf. JANET L. DOLGIN & LOIS L. SHEPHERD, 
BIOETHICS AND THE LAW 459 (4th ed. 2019) (asking whether Cruzan should be 
read “as upholding a constitutional ‘right to die’ or merely a ‘right to refuse 
treatment’?” (emphasis added)). 
 103. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280–84 (finding Missouri’s interests to be 
heightened where a patient lacks capacity to make medical decisions). 
 104. See, e.g., S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 590 U.S. ___ 
(2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“Our Constitution principally entrusts ‘[t]he 
safety and the health of the people’ to the politically accountable officials of the 
States ‘to guard and protect.’” (quoting Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 
38 (1905) (upholding a conviction and fine imposed to compel small pox vaccina-
tion))); Reynolds v. McNichols, 488 F.2d 1378, 1383 (10th Cir. 1973) (approving 
an ordinance “authorizing limited detention in jail without bond for the purpose 
of examination and treatment for a venereal disease of one reasonably sus-
pected of having a venereal disease . . . .”). But see Roman Catholic Diocese of 
Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 590 U.S. ___ (2021) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Jacobson 
hardly supports cutting the Constitution loose during a pandemic.”). 
 105. For example, forced suturing of an inmate’s open wound was not found 
to violate due process protections. Davis v. Agosto, 89 Fed. Appx. 523, 528 (6th 
Cir. 2004). Similarly, compelled injection of medically recommended insulin for 
the treatment of diabetes was constitutionally permissible. State ex rel. 
Schuetzle v. Vogel, 537 N.W.2d 358, 364 (N.D. 1995). Additionally, tuberculosis 
screening and treatment over the objection of an inmate has consistently been 
permitted. See, e.g., Parks v. McCoy, 35 Fed. Appx. 239, 241 (7th Cir. 2002); 
McCormick v. Stalder, 105 F.3d 1059, 1062 (5th Cir. 1997); Dunn v. Zenk, No. 
1:07-CV-2007-RLV, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73891, at *9 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 1, 2007). 
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this area largely centers around the practice of civil commit-
ment. Involuntary confinement of mentally ill individuals—as a 
method of treatment—historically derives from the police power 
of the states to regulate matters of health and safety amongst 
their civilian population; this was balanced with the principle of 
parens patriae, or “the government’s obligation to provide for the 
incapacitated.”106 
Early American psychiatric practice dictated that physi-
cians and monied family members had largely unchecked au-
thority to involuntarily commit persons with mental illness; a 
practice that was codified in the mid-1800s.107 At this time, court 
involvement in involuntary commitment was limited to indigent 
populations.108 Later in the nineteenth century, states began to 
enact legislation providing civil rights protections for mentally 
ill persons, often requiring a jury trial finding of insanity prior 
to, and judicial review after, involuntary commitment.109 These 
reforms culminated in a slew of early twentieth century state 
laws requiring two physicians to testify as to the need for com-
mitment.110 Despite these procedural reforms, from the eight-
eenth to early twentieth century the legal criteria for involun-
tary commitment remained unchanged: “the person was 
mentally ill and in need of treatment.”111 
Substantive change in civil commitment standards arrived 
in the 1970s, at which time “every state” had “constricted its sub-
stantive standard for commitment to dangerousness to self or 
 
 106. See Megan Testa & Sara G. West, Civil Commitment in the United 
States, 7 PSYCHIATRY (EDGEMONT) 30, 32 (2010) (describing an 1860s case in 
which a court allowed for the involuntary hospitalization of a woman on the 
principle of the state’s authority acting in parens patriae). Interestingly, the 
parens patriae authority sounds in beneficence, a pillar of medical ethics. C.f. 
T. L. Beauchamp, Methods and Principles in Biomedical Ethics, 29 J. MED. ETH-
ICS 269, 269, 271 (2003) (framing beneficence and parens patriae in the context 
of practical medical ethics). 
 107. See Testa & West, supra note 106, at 32 (“[I]t was quite possible for 
families to purchase the confinement of unwanted relatives.”). 
 108. Cf. id. (“Prior to the inception of American asylums, people with mental 
illness were relegated to prisons and shelters for the poor.”). 
 109. See id. at 32–33 (describing statutory changes requiring a trial for civil 
commitment). 
 110. See id. 
 111.  See AMA, Code of Medical Ethics Opinion 2.1.2, https://www.ama-
assn.org/delivering-care/ethics/decisions-adult-patients-who-lack-capacity (last 
visited Feb. 2, 2020). 
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others.”112 The Supreme Court entered the affray in the 1972 
case of Jackson v. Indiana.113 Acknowledging the states’ “broad 
power to commit persons found to be mentally ill,”114 the Court 
held, “due process requires that the nature and duration of com-
mitment must bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for 
which the individual is committed.”115 To involuntarily commit 
an adult, the state must show not only that they have a mental 
illness but also that they are a danger to themselves or others.116 
This must be shown by “the ‘clear and convincing’ standard” 
which “is required to meet due process guarantees.”117 Individu-
als who are legally civilly committed maintain a due process 
right to be free from unnecessary confinement or unnecessary 
personal restraint.118 
 
 112. Testa & West, supra note 106, at 33 (emphasis added). 
 113. 406 U.S. 715, 717, 740 (ruling on a case of indefinite pretrial commit-
ment of an individual with organic mental illness accused of two robberies un-
der Indiana state law). 
 114. Id. at 736. 
 115. Id. at 738 (analogizing the practice of civil commitment to the confine-
ment of convicted criminals for the purposes of due process protections); see id. 
at 726–27. 
 116. See O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975) (“A finding of 
‘mental illness’ alone cannot justify a State’s locking a person up against his 
will and keeping him indefinitely in simple custodial confinement. Assuming 
that that term can be given a reasonably precise content and that the ‘mentally 
ill’ can be identified with reasonable accuracy, there is still no constitutional 
basis for confining such persons involuntarily if they are dangerous to no one 
and can live safely in freedom.”). 
 117. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979). In Addington, the civil 
commitment proceeding did not emerge from pretrial commitment in a criminal 
action, but instead from appellant’s mother’s “petition for . . . indefinite commit-
ment.” Id. at 420. In cases where the individual with mental illness is a minor, 
the Court has found that due processes does not require an adversarial hearing 
for parent-initiated petitions; rather, with parental consent, the decision of a 
trained psychiatrist is sufficient to “render psychiatric judgements.” Parham v. 
J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 607 (1979) (quoting In re Roger S., 569 P.2d 1286, 1299 (Cal. 
1977) (Clark, J., dissenting)). 
 118. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316, 319, 320 (1982) (hold-
ing that civilly committed individuals have due process rights to safe conditions 
and “freedom from bodily restraint,” but that these rights are bounded by the 
“necessary . . . balance” between “‘the liberty of the individual’ and ‘the de-
mands of an organized society.’” (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 
(1961))). This accords with the Court’s findings of the state’s interest in control-
ling medical decision making over the right of a non-committed patient to make 
decisions about his or her own care, as discussed in notes 102–105 and accom-
panying texts. 
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C. LEGAL PROTECTIONS DURING PRETRIAL DETENTION AND IN 
PRISON 
The Supreme Court has never defined the boundaries of a 
civilly committed person’s right to refuse treatment.119 However, 
the Court has delineated substantive and procedural due process 
rights in the contexts of pretrial commitment and prison. In the 
landmark case Washington v. Harper, the Supreme Court laid 
down the substantive and procedural due process boundaries for 
involuntary antipsychotic treatment of convicted inmates.120 To 
determine “reasonableness,” any prison regulation (here, estab-
lishing a procedure for involuntary treatment of mentally ill in-
mates) must first be premised on a “‘valid, rational connection’ 
. . . [with] the legitimate governmental interest put forward to 
justify it.”121 Further, Harper requires a decisionmaker to “con-
sider ‘the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional 
right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the alloca-
tion of prison resources generally.’”122 Finally, a decisionmaker 
 
 119. Cf. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 305 (1982) (“[I]t would be inappropri-
ate for us to attempt to weigh or even to identify relevant liberty interests that 
might be derived directly from the Constitution, independently of [Massachu-
setts] state law.”). In Mills, the operative question was “whether an involuntar-
ily committed mental patient has a constitutional right to refuse treatment with 
antipsychotic drugs.” Id. at 298–99 (footnote omitted). Subsequently, the Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled that while involuntary commit-
ment itself is not sufficient to overcome a patient’s right to refuse antipsychotic 
medication, where a judge has ruled a patient incompetent, a court may act in 
substituted judgment on behalf of the patient in accepting the treatment plan. 
Rogers v. Comm’r of Dep’t of Mental Health, 458 N.E.2d 308, 318 (Mass. 1983) 
(discussing how a judge should determine whether to “approve a substituted 
judgment treatment plan”). This rule is cited as the seminal ruling regarding 
the right of involuntarily committed patients to refuse treatment. See, e.g., Hal 
S. Wortzel, The Right to Refuse Treatment, 23 PSYCHIATRIC TIMES (Dec. 1, 
2006), https://www.psychiatrictimes.com/right-refuse-treatment/ (situating the 
Rogers case within current legal doctrines surrounding patients’ right to refuse 
treatment generally). 
 120. 494 U.S. 210, 233–36 (1990). 
 121. Id. at 224 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)). 
 122. Id. at 225 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 90). Ruling on the statutory re-
quirements of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12131 et seq, the Supreme Court held that states must: 
provide community-based treatment for persons with mental disabili-
ties when the State’s treatment professionals determine that such 
placement is appropriate, the affected persons do not oppose such 
treatment, and the placement can be reasonably accommodated, tak-
ing into account the resources available to the State and the needs of 
others with mental disabilities. 
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must consider “the absence of ready alternatives [a]s evidence of 
the reasonableness of a prison regulation.”123 
Applying these principles, the Harper court found that in-
voluntary antipsychotic administration in prison does not re-
quire a “judicial decisionmaker.”124 Instead, absent “institu-
tional biases [that] affect[] or alter[] the decision to medicate 
respondent against his will,” an administrative hearing panel 
composed of individuals who are not “involved in the inmate’s 
current treatment or diagnosis” meets procedural due process 
requirements.125 The Court balanced the liberty interest of an 
inmate in refusing treatment with the “legitimacy and the im-
portance of the governmental interest.”126 Substantively, the in-
voluntary antipsychotic medication must be “medically appro-
priate”127 and its administration, in accordance with prison 
 
Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 607 (1999). The court “confined” its review to 
statutory grounds, failing to reach the question of whether the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment similarly required outpatient commit-
ment where reasonable. Id. at 588. Contemporary critics of Olmstead contend 
that it fails to require states to establish community-based treatment programs 
and is therefore insufficiently protective of patient rights under the ADA. See, 
e.g., Paul S. Appelbaum, Least Restrictive Alternative Revisited: Olmstead’s Un-
certain Mandate for Community-Based Care, 50 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 1271, 
1272 (1999) (“Whatever else it may accomplish, the decision in Olmstead . . . is 
unlikely to precipitate the widespread creation of community-based services for 
persons with mental disabilities.”). Similar considerations also plague the ap-
plication of the ADA in prisons. Cf., e.g., Edison v. Douberly, 604 F.3d 1307, 
1310 (11th Cir. 2010) (reh’g denied) (finding privately owned prisons are not 
covered under Title II of the ADA). But see Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Ass’t 
Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice Civil Rights Div. & David J. Hickton, U.S. Att’y, 
U.S. Att’y’s Office, W.D. Pa., to Hon. Tom Corbett, Pa. Governor (May 31, 2013), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2013/06/03/cresson_find-
ings_5-31-13.pdf) (concluding that a prison’s use of prolonged isolation of men-
tally ill inmates without appropriate medical treatment in the setting of a 
“flawed” review process violated Title II of the ADA). 
 123. Harper, 494 U.S. at 225 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 90–91) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). This does not place a requirement on prison officials 
to “shoot down every conceivable alternative method of accommodating the 
claimant’s constitutional complaint.” Id. 
 124. Id. at 228, 233. 
 125. Id. at 233. 
 126. Id. at 225. The Court opined that “[t]here are few cases in which the 
State’s interest in combating the danger posed by a person to both himself and 
others is greater than in a prison environment, which, ‘by definition,’ is made 
up of persons with ‘a demonstrated proclivity for antisocial criminal, and often 
violent, conduct.’” Id. (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984)). 
 127. Id. at 222 n.8 (“That an inmate is mentally ill and dangerous is a nec-
essary condition to medication, but not a sufficient condition; before the hearing 
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policy, must be “reasonably related to legitimate penological in-
terests.”128 In practice, due process is satisfied if “the inmate is 
dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is in the in-
mate’s medical interest.”129 
In Riggins v. Nevada, the Supreme Court addressed invol-
untary medication the context of pretrial detention.130 The Court 
held that the government “certainly would have satisfied due 
process if the prosecution had demonstrated, and the District 
Court had found, that treatment with antipsychotic medication 
was medically appropriate and, considering less intrusive alter-
natives, essential for the sake of [the defendant’s] own safety or 
the safety of others.”131 Importantly, the Riggins court took issue 
with “the District Court allow[ing] administration of [an anti-
psychotic] to continue without making any determination of the 
need for this course or any findings about reasonable alterna-
tives.”132 The Riggins case is unique insofar as the defendant 
was later adjudged competent (even in the absence of medica-
tion) to stand trial. By contrast, Sell v. United States involved an 
incompetent defendant, and asked whether involuntary antipsy-
chotic medication could be used to restore his competency for 
trial.133 Expanding Harper and Riggins, the Court held that: 
the Constitution permits the Government involuntarily to administer 
antipsychotic drugs to a mentally ill defendant facing serious criminal 
charges in order to render that defendant competent to stand trial, but 
only if the treatment is medically appropriate, is substantially unlikely 
to have side effects that may undermine the fairness of the trial, and, 
 
committee determines whether these requirements are met, the inmate’s treat-
ing physician must first make the decision that medication is appropriate.”). 
 128. Id. at 223 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 129. Id. at 227. 
 130. 504 U.S. 127 (1992). 
 131. Id. at 136 (citing Harper, 494 U.S. at 225–26). 
 132. Id. The Court was also frustrated by the manner in which the district 
court conducted itself. Id. at 137 (noting “the court’s laconic order denying Rig-
gins’ motion” and failure to “acknowledge the defendant’s liberty interest in 
freedom from unwanted antipsychotic drugs.”). 
 133. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 178 (2003) (evaluating whether 
“forced administration of antipsychotic drugs to render [an individual] compe-
tent to stand trial unconstitutionally deprive[s] him of his ‘liberty’ to reject med-
ical treatment”). 
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taking account of less intrusive alternatives, is necessary significantly 
to further important governmental trial-related interests.134 
Each step in the Sell analysis requires a balance between 
the state interest in advancing a criminal trial against a defend-
ant and a defendant’s interest in avoiding unwanted medica-
tion.135 In both Riggins and Sell the Court was interested in res-
toration of competency as a sole justification for involuntary 
antipsychotic administration and the potential prejudicial effect 
treatment would have at trial.136 Each case suggests that the 
“dangerousness” prong of Harper represents an independent ra-
tionale for involuntary antipsychotic administration which does 
not require the additional analysis laid out in Sell.137 The Court, 
however, has never reached the question of whether medication 
can be forcibly administered to a legally competent or incompe-
tent defendant or inmate who maintains the mental capacity to 
make decisions about his or her health care. However, the Sell 
court, in dicta, suggested that civil mechanisms prescribed by 
state law should guide courts’ decisions regarding the imposition 
of substituted judgment when capacity is at issue.138 
 
 134. Id. at 179. Ultimately, the Court found in favor of defendant on the ba-
sis that the record was not developed with regard to whether side effects of an-
tipsychotic treatment (namely drowsiness) might negatively impact his de-
meanor at trial. Id. at 185–86 (“We cannot tell whether the side effects of 
antipsychotic medication were likely to undermine the fairness of a trial in 
Sell’s case.”). Further, the lower courts failed to contemplate whether involun-
tary medication would lengthen the amount of time Sell would spend in a men-
tal health facility, militating against the government’s interest in adjudging 
him guilty to serve punishment by lengthening his pretrial detention. Id. at 186 
(“[T]he lower courts did not consider that Sell has already been confined at the 
Medical Center for a long period of time, and that his refusal to take antipsy-
chotic drugs might result in further lengthy confinement.”). 
 135. See generally id. at 180–81 (listing, in detail, the four elements the gov-
ernment must prove, and factors that affect the government’s interests). 
 136. See id. at 186 (noting the potential interference with the “fairness” of a 
subsequent trial); Riggins, 504 U.S. at 138 (“[W]e have no basis for saying that 
the substantial probability of trial prejudice in this case was justified.”). 
 137. See, e.g., Sell, 539 U.S. at 178 (“[T]he Due Process Clause permits the 
State to treat a prison inmate who has a serious mental illness with antipsy-
chotic drugs against his will, if the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and 
the treatment is in the inmate’s medical interest.” (quoting Washington v. Har-
per, 494 U.S. 210, 227 (1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 138. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 182 (“Every State provides avenues through which, 
for example, a doctor or institution can seek appointment of a guardian with 
the power to make a decision authorizing medication—when in the best inter-
ests of a patient who lacks the mental competence to make such a decision.” 
(citation omitted)). 
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Despite imprisonment, inmates retain due process protec-
tions for some other liberty interests.139 In Hewitt v. Helms, the 
Supreme Court ruled that Pennsylvania inmates had a statuto-
rily-created liberty interest in remaining in the general popula-
tion.140 However, subsequently, in Sandin v. Conner, the Court 
abandoned the test used in Hewitt without overruling it.141 
While state statutes can create liberty interests for inmates, 
“these interests will be generally limited to freedom from re-
straint . . . while not exceeding the sentence in such an unex-
pected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process 
Clause of its own force.”142 In practice, the Sandin ruling does 
not completely immunize administrative segregation decisions 
made by prison officials from constitutional claims of due process 
 
 139. Cf. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467 (1983) (“We have repeatedly said 
both that prison officials have broad administrative and discretionary authority 
over the institutions they manage and that lawfully incarcerated persons retain 
only a narrow range of protected liberty interests.” (emphasis added)); cf. also, 
e.g., McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 36 (2017) (“The privilege against self-incrim-
ination does not terminate at the jailhouse door, but the fact of a valid conviction 
and the ensuing restrictions on liberty are essential to the Fifth Amendment 
analysis.”). 
 140. See Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 470–71 (“[W]e conclude in the light of the Penn-
sylvania statutes and regulations here in question . . . that respondent did ac-
quire a protected liberty interest in remaining in the general prison popula-
tion.”). 
 141. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483 n.5 (1995) (“Such abandonment 
of Hewitt’s methodology does not technically require us to overrule any holding 
of this Court.”). 
 142. Id. at 484; see also Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 223–24 (2005) 
(finding the Due Process Clause was implicated when an inmate was trans-
ferred to a Supermax facility where “almost all human contact is prohibited, 
even to the point that conversation is not permitted from cell to cell; the light, 
though it may be dimmed, is on for 24 hours; exercise is for 1 hour per day, but 
only in a small indoor room” and the term of confinement is indefinite with only 
annual review); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 228 (1976) (“Whatever expec-
tation the prisoner may have in remaining at a particular prison so long as he 
behaves himself, it is too ephemeral and insubstantial to trigger procedural due 
process protections as long as prison officials have discretion to transfer him for 
whatever reason or for no reason at all.”). But see Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 
539, 557 (1974) (“[T]he State having created the right to good time and itself 
recognizing that its deprivation is a sanction authorized for major misconduct, 
the prisoner’s interest has real substance and is sufficiently embraced within 
Fourteenth Amendment ‘liberty’ to entitle him to those minimum procedures 
appropriate under the circumstances and required by the Due Process Clause 
to insure [sic] that the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated.”). 
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violation.143 Even without an asserted statutory right, due pro-
cess protections are triggered by “transfer to a mental hospital 
for involuntary psychiatric treatment” due to “the stigmatizing 
consequences . . . [and] mandatory behavior modification as a 
treatment.”144 
IV. MEDICAL SEGREGATION AS A TREATMENT 
MODALITY 
A. APPLYING EXISTING LAW TO MEDICAL SEGREGATION IN 
PRISON 
As described above, medical segregation can be divided into 
three broad categories: off-site medical segregation, medical seg-
regation in solitary-confinement-like conditions, and medical 
segregation in “intermediate security” housing. Each of these 
conditions may implicate a different legal test to determine 
whether they “exceed[] the sentence in . . . an unexpected man-
ner” and are therefore entitled to due process protections under 
the Fourteenth Amendment.145 Courts have considered different 
factors when applying due process protections to supermax con-
finement146 or long-term punitive segregation without review,147 
revocation of “good time credit” resulting in a longer prison 
 
 143. See, e.g., Marion v. Columbia Corr. Inst., 559 F.3d 693, 694 (7th Cir. 
2009) (“[W]e hold that the 240 days of segregation in this case was sufficiently 
long to implicate a cognizable liberty interest if the conditions of confinement 
during that period were sufficiently severe.”); cf., e.g., Sealey v. Giltner, 197 
F.3d 578, 587 n.7 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[I]f conditions were of sufficient harshness 
that confinement for 365 days constituted atypicality, an official who held a 
hearing for a prisoner already confined in such conditions for 364 days would 
normally have to accord procedural due process before continuing the confine-
ment beyond an aggregate interval of 365 days.”). 
 144. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494 (1980). 
 145. See supra Part III.C. 
 146. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 223–24 (2005). 
 147. See Marion, 559 F.3d at 697 (“The Supreme Court’s decisions in Sandin 
and Wilkinson establish that disciplinary segregation can trigger due process 
protections depending on the duration and conditions of segregation.”); cf., e.g., 
Townsend v. Fuchs, 522 F.3d 765, 772 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[B]ecause Townsend’s 
placement in [temporary lock-up] neither was indefinite, nor affected his parole 
eligibility, nothing in Wilkinson requires us to reconsider our established posi-
tion that inmates have no liberty interest in avoiding placement in discretion-
ary segregation.”). 
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term,148 transfer to a mental hospital,149 and involuntary anti-
psychotic administration.150 All have been held to implicate lib-
erty interests; however, none of these due process analyses are 
adequate to capture the particular harms of medical segregation 
to the liberty interests of mentally ill inmates. 
1. Comparing Medical Segregation to Solitary Confinement 
To compare medical segregation to solitary confinement the 
practice must be situated on a continuum between the circum-
stances of Sandin v. Conner and the circumstances of Marion v. 
Columbia Correctional Institute.151 In Sandin, respondent in-
mate was sentenced to thirty days of disciplinary segregation; in 
Marion, appellant inmate was sentenced to 240 days of segrega-
tion.152 In both cases, the inmates were not allowed to proffer 
witnesses to testify that the alleged disciplinary infraction did 
not occur.153 
In Sandin, the Supreme Court only considered the short du-
ration of disciplinary segregation when it determined that the 
“nature of the depravation” was contained “within the expected 
parameters of the sentence imposed by a court of law.”154 In Mar-
ion, however, the Seventh Circuit looked beyond the mere dura-
tion of confinement to the “conditions of the segregation” specif-
ically asking whether “the conditions of segregation were 
significantly harsher than those in the normal prison environ-
ment.”155 Conditions that violate that liberty interest, the Sev-
enth Circuit opined, include “more restrictive prison conditions 
if those conditions result in an ‘atypical and significant hardship’ 
 
 148. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 228 (1976). 
 149. Vitek, 445 U.S. at 494. 
 150. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 213 (1990). 
 151. See generally Sealy v. Giltner, 197 F.3d 578 (2d Cir. 1999) (looking at 
this continuum to determine whether due process was implicated). 
 152. Compare Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 475–76 (1995) (describing the 
alleged violation of liberty interest), with Marion v. Columbia Corr. Inst., 559 
F.3d 693, 695 (7th Cir. 2009) (construing Sandin and describing the duration of 
disciplinary segregation). 
 153. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 475; Marion, 559 F.3d at 695. 
 154. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 481, 485–86. 
 155. Marion, 559 F.3d at 698 (quoting Bryan v. Duckworth, 88 F.3d 431, 433 
(1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Note that the Seventh Circuit only 
examines conditions if confinement extends beyond six months. Id. 
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when compared to ‘the ordinary incidents of prison life.’”156 A 
similar test has been adopted by multiple circuits.157 The Su-
preme Court has also looked to conditions beyond the mere du-
ration of confinement when considering supermax detention and 
mental hospital transfers.158 
The New Jersey practice of automatic, near-universal med-
ical segregation does not implicate the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
due process protections under punitive segregation case law. 
First, the policy is discretionary, rather than punitive.159 In some 
jurisdictions non-punitive prison housing decisions are not sub-
ject to due process analysis.160 Second, the duration of the invol-
untary antipsychotic protocol are relatively short161 and would 
not trigger due process protections in most jurisdictions.162 
 
 156. Townsend v. Fuchs, 522 F.3d 765, 768 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Sandin, 
515 U.S. at 484–86). 
 157. See Harden-Bey v. Rutter, 524 F.3d 789, 793 (6th Cir. 2008) (“[M]ost (if 
not all) of our sister circuits have considered the nature of the more-restrictive 
confinement and its duration in determining whether it imposes an ‘atypical 
and significant hardship.’”); see also, e.g., Wilkerson v. Goodwin, 774 F.3d 845, 
855 (5th Cir. 2014) (examining the restrictiveness of conditions); Brown v. Pa. 
Dep’t of Corr., 290 Fed. Appx. 463, 465 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting that “[r]outine 
transfer” can require due process protections if the conditions pose unique hard-
ship) (citing Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484); Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d 1210, 1225 
(10th Cir. 2006) (requiring trial courts to examine “whether . . . confinement 
was atypical and significant when compared to conditions imposed on other 
prisoners”). The Fifth Circuit wrote a detailed account of how its sister circuit 
courts use “conditions” in determining Fourteenth Amendment due process 
rights in the context of administrative segregation. See Wilkerson, 774 F.3d at 
854–55 (“Courts have considered different baselines when determining what 
conditions are ‘atypical’ in a particular case.”). 
 158. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 223–24 (2005) (analyzing factors af-
fecting due process in a supermax prison transfer challenge); Vitek v. Jones, 
445 U.S. 480, 494 (1980) (considering factors relevant to due process in the case 
of transfer from prison to a state mental hospital). 
 159. See Salem et al., supra note 5, at 163; cf. NATASHA A. FROST & CARLOS 
E. MONTEIRO, ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION IN U.S. PRISONS 5, 8 (2016) (com-
paring administrative segregation, which is discretionary, with punitive segre-
gation which is not). 
 160. See, e.g., Townsend, 522 F.3d at 772 (citing Holly v. Woolfolk, 415 F.3d 
678, 680 (7th Cir. 2005)) (“[B]eing placed in segregation is too trivial an incre-
mental deprivation of a convicted prisoner’s liberty to trigger the duty of due 
process”). 
 161. Salem et al., supra note 5, at 161 (describing the NJ DOC involuntary 
treatment protocol durations: 30 days, then 180 days between due process re-
view and approval). 
 162. See Marion v. Columbia Corr. Inst., 559 F.3d 693, 698 (7th Cir. 2009) 
(noting that “six months of segregation is ‘not such an extreme term’ and, stand-
ing alone, would not trigger due process rights”). 
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Third, the conditions described by Salem and colleagues do not 
implicate due process protections.163 Finally, New Jersey’s un-
written policy does not create a liberty interest in remaining free 
from medical segregation that would give rise to a claim under 
Hewitt.164 
In some penitentiary systems, however, medical segregation 
is little more than glorified solitary confinement.165 In those ju-
risdictions inmates may have a colorable claim that medical seg-
regation exceeds the expected parameters of an ordinary prison 
sentence. However, appellate courts have construed Sandin and 
Wilkinson v. Austin166 narrowly and the precedent developed 
around solitary confinement is a poor fit in the context of medical 
segregation.167 Using punitive segregation case law will be una-
vailing for most inmates seeking Fourteenth Amendment pro-
tections from capricious involuntary medical segregation. Per-
haps due process protection from institutionalization in an off-
site mental hospital provides protection from on-site medical 
segregation. 
2. On-Site Medical Segregation and Stigmatization 
In Vitek v. Jones, the Supreme Court recognized that trans-
fer to a mental hospital from prison carried attendant “stigma-
tizing consequences” that inmates possess a liberty interest in 
 
 163. See Salem et al., supra note 5, at 163 (“There is no external pressure, 
as there is in a community hospital that is subject to an insurance company’s 
review, to discharge patients from the NJ DOC’s prison inpatient units. Inmates 
enjoy the relative security and enhanced programming and attention offered on 
the inpatient units. Indeed inmates, both mentally ill and not, occasionally feign 
symptoms to secure placement on an inpatient unit and avoid release from the 
same.”). 
 164. See supra notes 139–42 and accompanying text. 
 165.  Cf., e.g., Alex Hundert, Down in a Hole, BRIARPATCH (Mar. 22, 2013), 
https://briarpatchmagazine.com/articles/view/down-in-a-hole (“‘They push you 
till you snap,’ a man imprisoned in these circumstances told me. Days later, the 
prison equivalent of a riot squad rushed his cell. Dressed in full storm trooper 
gear, they dragged him off to a separate section of the unit – medical segregation 
– and threw him into ‘the rubber room.’”); Maya Srikrishnan, Documents Allege 
Serious Medical Neglect Inside Otay Mesa Detention Center, KPBS (Aug. 15, 
2019), https://www.kpbs.org/news/2019/aug/15/documents-allege-serious-medi-
cal-neglect-inside-ot/ (comparing medical segregation in immigration detention 
centers to solitary confinement). 
 166. 545 U.S. 209 (2005). 
 167. E.g., Holly v. Woolfolk, 415 F.3d 678, 680 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding that 
nonpunitive segregation is “too trivial” to implicate due process rights). 
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remaining free from.168 Could the same be true for on- or off-site 
medical segregation? Inmates labeled as mentally ill receive less 
attention from prison staff and guards,169 potentially leading to 
an increased danger of suicide, self-harm, or harm to others.170 
Further, inmates who carry the stigma of mental illness “are of-
ten ostracized by other inmates.”171 Real and perceived ostraci-
zation negatively influence mental health outcomes172 and are 
linked to antisocial and aggressive behavior.173 However, in-
mates and other plaintiffs have had mixed success convincing 
courts to extend Vitek’s “stigmatization” interest into other cir-
cumstances inside and outside the prison.174 
 
 168. 445 U.S. 480, 494 (1980). The Vitek Court continued, “A criminal con-
viction and sentence of imprisonment extinguish an individual’s right to free-
dom from confinement for the term of his sentence, but they do not authorize 
the State to classify him as mentally ill and to subject him to involuntary psy-
chiatric treatment without affording him additional due process protections.” 
Id. at 493–94. 
 169. Cf. Elizabeth Ford, Why We Shouldn’t Stigmatize Mentally Ill Prison-
ers, TIME (May 17, 2017), https://time.com/4782404/prison-mental-health-
stigma-suicide (“Very few officers or health staff wanted to work in them.”). 
 170. See id. (attributing the death of a schizophrenic inmate in a Rikers Is-
land mental health unit to stigmatization and inattention from guards and 
staff); Dean Aufderheide, Toward a Public Safety/Public Health Model, 
HEALTHAFFAIRS (Apr. 1, 2014), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/
hblog20140401.038180/full/ (describing the effects of stigma on some mentally 
ill inmates). For instance, “[s]ome become overly passive, withdrawn and de-
pendent during incarceration; others may become agitated, episodically violent, 
or engage in non-suicidal self-injurious behaviors.” Id. “[I]nmates with mental 
illness [are] often punished for their symptoms. As a result, the report noted, 
prisoners with mental illness often have extensive disciplinary histories.” Id. 
(citing HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL EQUIPPED: U.S. PRISONS AND OFFENDERS 
WITH MENTAL ILLNESS (2009)). 
 171. Aufderheide, supra note 170. 
 172. Cf., e.g., Eric D. Wesselmann et al., Does Perceived Ostracism Contrib-
ute to Mental Health Concerns Among Veterans Who Have Been Deployed, 13 
PLOS ONE 8 (2018) (noting preliminary empirical evidence that perceived os-
tracism is linked with frequently occurring psychological problems in combat 
veterans). 
 173. See, e.g., Beth Azar, Singled Out, 40 MONITOR PSYCH. 36, 38–40 (2009) 
(noting that antisocial and aggressive behaviors may stem from ostracism). Cf., 
e.g., Wesselmann et al., supra note 172, at 6 (finding that perceived ostracism 
correlated with PTSD symptomatology and symptoms of anxiety). 
 174. See Coleman v. Dretke, 395 F.3d 216, 223–24 (2004) (finding that the 
stigmatizing effect of labeling an inmate a sex offender, despite no conviction 
with a sex offense to be “materially indistinguishable from Vitek”); see also 
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 114 (1992) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Stig-
matization (our concern in Vitek) is simply not a relevant consideration where 
insanity acquittees are involved.”); Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 367 
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A large portion of penitentiaries lack inpatient wards for in-
mates with mental illnesses and must transfer inmates to com-
munity hospitals or state mental hospitals to provide the type of 
inpatient care available in the New Jersey prison system studied 
by Salem and colleagues.175 Medical segregation in these peni-
tentiaries involves taking inmates off-site to a mental hospital 
or equivalent. While not a “transfer to a mental hospital” per se, 
this is precisely the type of practice that Vitek found implicated 
the Fourteenth Amendment.176 In contrast, when inmates re-
ceiving involuntary antipsychotic medication are kept in on-site 
inpatient wards, the Vitek argument is weaker because due pro-
cess protections do not extend to “state action taken ‘within the 
sentence imposed.’”177 Despite this, Vitek insists that transfer to 
a hospital or civil commitment-like setting may fall outside of 
the imposed sentence because of the stigmatization associated 
with the hospitalization itself.178 However, unlike Vitek, off-site 
medical segregation in a community hospital is not an indefinite 
transfer and has a putative end date: when the involuntary 
treatment protocol expires.179 Courts of appeal have been reluc-
tant to find Fourteenth Amendment protections apply without 
an element of indefiniteness.180 Ergo, the Vitek analysis also of-




n.16 (1983) (“A criminal defendant who successfully raises the insanity defense 
necessarily is stigmatized by the verdict itself, and thus the commitment causes 
little additional harm in this respect”). 
 175. KARISHMA A. CHARI ET AL., NATIONAL SURVEY OF PRISON HEALTH 
CARE: SELECTED FINDINGS 5 (2016) (“Of the 45 participating states, 44 deliv-
ered outpatient mental health care exclusively on-site. In 27 states, inpatient 
mental health care was delivered exclusively on-site. Three states delivered in-
patient mental health care exclusively off-site.”). 
 176. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 496 (1980) (emphasis added). Namely, 
“classify[ing a prisoner] as mentally ill.” Id. at 493–94. 
 177. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 480 (1995) (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 
459 U.S. 460, 478 (1983)). 
 178. Vitek, 445 U.S. at 494. 
 179. Contra Townsend v. Fuchs, 522 F.3d 765, 772 (7th Cir. 2008) (making 
indefiniteness and punitive-nature the requisite standard to trigger due process 
rights in the context of administrative segregation). 
 180. Id.; cf. also Marion v. Columbia Corr. Inst., 559 F.3d 693, 694 (7th Cir. 
2009) (finding 240 days of disciplinary segregation was sufficient to create a 
cognizable liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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If due process protections are to extend to all forms of arbi-
trary medical segregation, courts must look back into history, 
and recognize that just like involuntary pharmacotherapy (pro-
tected under Harper), confinement, segregation, and restraint 
are also anachronistic forms of treatment justified by clinical ra-
tionales. Therefore, medical segregation should trigger the same 
due process protections as involuntary medication. 
B. REIMAGINING MEDICAL SEGREGATION AS A TREATMENT 
UNDER HARPER 
If medical segregation is framed as a type of medical treat-
ment, due process protections exist even if the duration and con-
ditions of segregation are only nominally different from the ex-
pected parameters of an ordinary prison sentence and no 
statutorily created liberty interest exists. Washington v. Harper 
held that inmates have a liberty interest in avoiding involuntary 
treatment and defined the due process required to protect that 
interest.181 While the right to refuse treatment is colloquially 
viewed as the right to decline or discontinue medical interven-
tions, patients in the community retain the right to remove 
themselves from the medical care setting entirely in most cir-
cumstances.182 Indeed, physicians who restrain patients or com-
pel them to stay in a medical care facility without other legal 
justification can be subject to tort actions in false imprison-
ment.183 The rationale supporting nonemergency involuntary 
 
 181. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 227 (1990) (“[T]he Due Process 
Clause permits the State to treat a prison inmate who has a serious mental 
illness with antipsychotic drugs against his will, if the inmate is dangerous to 
himself or others and the treatment is in the inmate’s medical interest.”); see 
also Vitek, 445 U.S. at 493–94 (“A criminal conviction . . . do[es] not authorize 
the State to classify [a prisoner] as mentally ill and to subject him to involuntary 
psychiatric treatment without affording him additional due process protec-
tions.”). 
 182. So called “discharges against medical advice.” See generally David J. 
Alfandre, “I’m Going Home”: Discharges Against Medical Advice, 84 MAYO 
CLINIC PROC. 255 (2009). 
 183. See, e.g., Arthur H. Coleman, False Imprisonment of a Patient, 55 J. 
NAT’L MED. ASS’N 85, 85 (1963) (summarizing the seminal case Maben v. Ran-
kin, 358 P.2d 681 (1961)). 
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antipsychotic treatment is explicitly tied to medical appropriate-
ness as a matter of regulatory policy184 and as a matter of con-
stitutional law.185 Reading Harper, Riggins, and Sell together, 
medical appropriateness is a threshold question for an involun-
tary treatment due process hearing in the setting of both pretrial 
detention and postconviction incarceration.186 
The constitutional interest in maintaining voluntary bodily 
integrity is not implicated by involuntary medical segregation. 
Nevertheless, involuntary medical segregation can be conceptu-
alized as a form of medical treatment. Segregation has profound 
implications for clinical outcomes in the treatment of mental ill-
ness—both positive and negative187—and plays a role in the pre-
vention and early detection of important side effects.188 As such, 
the practice should be treated with the same level of due process 
scrutiny as the actual antipsychotic treatment itself. The Con-
 
 184. See, e.g., Salem et al., supra note 5, at 160 (“[NJ DOC policy provides 
that m]erely disruptive inmates may not be involuntarily medicated.”); cf. Andy 
Mannix, At Urging of Minneapolis Police, Hennepin EMS Workers Subdued 
Dozens with a Powerful Sedative, STARTRIBUNE (June 15, 2018), 
https://www.startribune.com/at-urging-of-police-hennepin-emts-subdued-doz-
ens-with-powerful-sedative/485607381/ (describing a draft change in Minneap-
olis police policy forbidding non-medical use of sedative drugs at the urging of 
law enforcement). 
 185. See Harper, 494 U.S. at 222 n.8 (“That an inmate is mentally ill and 
dangerous is a necessary condition to medication, but not a sufficient condition; 
before the hearing committee determines whether these requirements are met, 
the inmate’s treating physician must first make the decision that medication is 
appropriate.”). 
 186. Id.; Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 179 (2003) (“[T]he Constitution 
permits the Government involuntarily to administer antipsychotic drugs to a 
mentally ill defendant facing serious criminal charges in order to render that 
defendant competent to stand trial, but only if the treatment is medically ap-
propriate . . . .”); Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992) (“Nevada certainly 
would have satisfied due process if the prosecution had demonstrated . . . that 
treatment with antipsychotic medication was medically appropriate and, con-
sidering less intrusive alternatives, essential for the sake of Riggins’ own safety 
or the safety of others.”). 
 187. For example, the ability to monitor for potentially irreversible side ef-
fects of medication may be facilitated by close monitoring, thus attenuating the 
risk of treatment. Cf. supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text. Alternatively, 
however, mental health outcomes are poorer if a mentally ill individual is con-
fined or restrained. Cf. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 97. Also consider the 
abandonment of the practice of confining and restraining psychiatric patients 
in the late twentieth century because these were not effective treatment modal-
ities. See generally discussion supra Part I.A. 
 188. See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text. 
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stitution does not protect an inmate’s liberty interest in remain-
ing in the general population in the context of explicitly punitive 
administrative segregation.189 However, it is another question 
entirely whether involuntary segregation for explicitly medical 
purposes escapes due process considerations. 
Harper, Riggins, and Sell hold that the state must show 
treatment is medically necessary before asking whether there is 
a penological interest in involuntary treatment. If medical seg-
regation is considered part of the treatment protocol and sub-
jected to the Harper analysis, it is unlikely to be medically justi-
fied in most cases. Professional societies and advocacy groups 
argue involuntary inpatient commitment is more beneficial than 
treatment in prison, and involuntary outpatient commitment is 
more favorable than inpatient treatment.190 These values are 
natural extensions of the historical trend away from confine-
ment, isolation, and restraint in the treatment of psychiatric ill-
ness.191 Simply put, restraint and confinement are no longer con-
sidered appropriate medical modalities for the treatment of 
mental illness.192 This principle is acknowledged in state regu-
lation prohibiting nonemergency antipsychotic administration 
in cases of belligerent, mentally ill inmates with no other medi-
cal indication.193 Similarly, the use of neuroleptic medication for 
exclusively penological interests has been roundly criticized.194 
Even when some degree of confinement is medically necessary 
and legally warranted, it is understood that necessary medical 
confinement should not be punitive.195 
Because segregation has profound effects on medical out-
comes, the government should be required to show that involun-
tary medical segregation serves a medical purpose, just like in-
voluntary pharmaceutical treatment. If considered a form of 
treatment, inmates with mental illnesses are entitled to sub-
stantive and procedural due process protections prior to medical 
segregation. Additionally—while the balance between personal 
 
 189. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983) (overruled in part by Sandin v. 
Conner, 515 U.S. 472. 482 (1995)) (finding a statutory liberty interest in remain-
ing in the general population). 
 190. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 191. See discussion supra Parts I.B. & II.A. 
 192. Id. 
 193. See Salem et al., supra note 5, at 163. 
 194. See supra note 182 and accompanying text. 
 195. Cf. AM, PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 97. 
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liberty interests and legitimate governmental interests is tipped 
in favor of the government in a penal setting—the absence of any 
due process protections against unnecessary medical segrega-
tion, confinement, or restraint in the prison system is out of 
alignment with the due process requirements for involuntary 
commitment to mental hospitals in the community.196 The Har-
per analysis can be easily adapted to fill this role. 
First, Harper already incorporates, as a preliminary matter, 
the requirement that treatment is medically necessary. Apply-
ing this prong to medical segregation as a treatment simply re-
quires a preliminary showing from a treating psychiatrist that 
segregation is medically appropriate and is in the particular in-
mate’s medical interest.197 This has the benefit of preventing the 
removal of medically stable but mentally ill patients housed in 
the general population into a foreign, confined environment 
where psychological decompensation may occur. Second, the gov-
ernment must show a legitimate penological interest. While the 
Harper court indicated that being imprisoned essentially guar-
anteed a finding of legitimate penological interest,198 the analy-
sis provides a greater level of protection when pharmaceutical 
administration and medical segregation are reconceptualized as 
separate treatment modalities. When Harper’s second prong is 
applied to medical segregation, the government must show that 
involuntary pharmaceutical treatment and segregation together 
further its penological interest more than pharmaceutical treat-
ment alone. In many cases the argument that long term medical 
segregation is necessary due to inmate dangerousness will be 
 
 196. Cf. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (“[D]ue process requires that 
the nature and duration of commitment must bear some reasonable relation to 
the purpose for which the individual is committed.”). In the community setting, 
this standard includes showing both a legitimate medical reason for commit-
ment and a legitimate governmental interest, namely, the dangerousness 
standard that was universally adopted by the states by the 1970s. See O’Connor 
v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975) (noting that “‘mental illness’ alone can-
not justify” confinement); see also supra Part III.B (discussing reforms to in-
clude a dangerousness standard for civil commitment). 
 197. Notably, Riggins v. Nevada stands for the proposition that involuntary 
medical treatment must be particularized to the individual, disease, and cir-
cumstances. 504 U.S. 127, 136 (1992) (demanding, in the pretrial setting, that 
a court must make a “determination of the need for this course [Mellaril] 
or . . . reasonable alternatives” (emphasis added)). 
 198. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 225–26 (1990) (“[T]he State’s in-
terest in decreasing the danger to others necessarily encompasses an interest 
in providing him with medical treatment for his illness.”). 
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unavailing for the government199 because individuals with seri-
ous mental illness who are medicated (not confined, restrained, 
or segregated) are no more dangerous than individuals without 
mental illness.200 In fact, segregation, confinement, and re-
straint may be counterproductive as these conditions have been 
shown to lead to increased antisocial and aggressive behaviors 
in mentally ill populations.201 
Further, evidence showing depot antipsychotics are as safe 
as short-acting oral antipsychotics makes meeting this standard 
more difficult.202 When treating with oral medications, compli-
ance must be verified by regular observation or blood work. One 
method of ensuring compliance is placing an inmate in inpatient 
medical segregation. Depot medications, on the other hand, last 
for weeks—obviating the need to medically segregate inmates to 
monitor for medication compliance. Similarly, the need to moni-
tor for side effects is another medical justification for inpatient 
medical segregation. However, because rapid adjustments of 
dosage are precluded by depot medication, the need to titrate 
antipsychotic dosing under close supervision carries little weight 
as a justification for long-term medical segregation. In this 
sense, depot medications are a “ready alternative” to medical 
segregation.203 This does not mean that there can never be a 
medical justification for segregation of mentally ill inmates. Past 
medical history and poor or unpredictable responses to antipsy-
chotic medication may necessitate closer monitoring of an in-
mate’s mental and physical status. Additionally, a mentally de-
compensated patient who threatens self-harm or harm to others 
may require closer monitoring. Alternatively, the increased risk 
of victimization among populations of inmates with mental ill-
ness may require segregation for protection of that inmate. The 
benefit of treating medical segregation as a separate treatment 
modality under Harper ensures that medical segregation is not 
a “go-to” measure used by prison officials to control the behavior 
 
 199. Contra id. 
 200. Cf. supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text. 
 201. Cf. Aufderheide, supra note 170. 
 202. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 203. Harper, 494 U.S. at 224. However, Harper—relying on Turner v. 
Safley—also notes that allocation of prison resources must be considered when 
determining the constitutional validity of an involuntary treatment program. 
Accordingly, states may argue that they lack the resources to provide depot 
medications to inmates who wish to avoid prolonged medical segregation, thus 
overcoming this argument. 
2021] MEDICATE AND SEGREGATE 115 
 
of mentally ill inmates. Rather, the government must articulate 
a particularized medical need for segregation. 
Requiring the government to overcome a due process hurdle 
is critical to ensuring that inmates are not capriciously subjected 
to the anachronistic and defunct practice of confinement and re-
straint that typified psychiatric practice prior to the develop-
ment of antipsychotic drugs. The Harper analysis is a pragmatic 
solution; it recognizes that there are some instances where a par-
ticular inmate may have an individual medical need for which 
segregation from the general population is appropriate. At the 
least, applying Harper would compel the government to articu-
late its medical and penological need for segregating, confining, 
or restraining a mentally ill inmate. Substantively, requiring 
that segregation be medically necessary for the individual in-
mate will ensure that prison officials cannot simply recite “magic 
words” to segregate all mentally ill inmates receiving antipsy-
chotic treatment. Put another way, “[t]hat an inmate is mentally 
ill and dangerous is a necessary condition to” medically segre-
gate, “but not a sufficient condition; before the hearing commit-
tee determines whether these requirements are met, the in-
mate’s treating physician must first make the decision that” 
medical segregation is appropriate.204 
CONCLUSION 
While involuntary medical segregation of inmates with 
mental illness may be necessary in some situations, New Jer-
sey’s unwritten policy of automatic, near-universal medical seg-
regation of inmates subjected to involuntary antipsychotic ad-
ministration sweeps far too broadly. Just as the development of 
FGA agents obviated the need to restrain people with mental 
illness as a form of treatment, long-acting depot medications 
render involuntary medical segregation of mentally ill inmates 
largely redundant from a medical and penological standpoint. 
New Jersey’s unchecked policy of automatic medical segregation 
 
 204. Id. at 222 n.8. Note also that Harper-protocols are not indefinite and 
require periodic review. See, e.g., Salem et al., supra note 5, at 160 (describing 
how protocol extensions are granted under New Jersey’s Harper-compliant in-
voluntary antipsychotic administration procedure). At each renewal hearing for 
a Harper protocol, the State would be required to prove that segregation re-
mains medically necessary. If there were an instance where extremely long 
medical confinement was approved, due process analysis under the Sell and 
Wilkinson would likely be triggered. 
116 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 22:2 
 
illustrates a defect in due process jurisprudence. Reconceptual-
izing medical segregation as a mode of treatment cures this de-
fect by providing due process protections for an already acknowl-
edged liberty interest in avoiding unwanted medical treatment 
under Washington v. Harper. 
New Jersey’s medical segregation housing units are largely 
indistinguishable from general population housing; however, 
this is not the case in many other state prison systems. In some 
states, medical segregation is little more than glorified solitary 
confinement. As societal norms and psychiatric practice have 
evolved to disfavor confinement, restraint, and segregation as 
methods for controlling the behavior of people with mental ill-
ness, efforts at reform have paradoxically led to a different form 
of restraint: imprisonment and medical segregation. The degree 
of confinement, restraint, and segregation faced by inmates with 
mental illness in various jurisdictions has not been systemati-
cally studied and remains shrouded in the unwritten policies of 
departments of corrections throughout the nation. Applying the 
due process protections promulgated by Harper to the practice 
of involuntary medical segregation for mental illness represents 
a modest step towards aligning the medical treatment of men-
tally ill inmates with modern psychiatric practice and the in-
tended objectives of the deinstitutionalization movement. 
